# 1NC

### T

***Most predictable—the agent and verb of the resolution indicate a debate about hypothetical action***

**Ericson 3** (Jon M., Dean Emeritus of the College of Liberal Arts – California Polytechnic U., et al., The Debater’s Guide, Third Edition, p. 4)

The Proposition of Policy: Urging Future Action In policy propositions, **each topic contains certain key elements**, although they have slightly different functions from comparable elements of value-oriented propositions. 1. **An agent doing the acting ---“The United States” in “The United States should** adopt a policy of free trade.” Like the object of evaluation in a proposition of value, **the agent is the subject of the sentence. 2. The verb should**—the first part of a verb phrase **that urges action**. 3. An action verb to follow should in the should-verb combination. **For example, should****adopt** here **means to put a** program or **policy into action though governmental means**. 4. A specification of directions or a limitation of the action desired. The phrase free trade, for example, gives direction and limits to the topic, which would, for example, eliminate consideration of increasing tariffs, discussing diplomatic recognition, or discussing interstate commerce. Propositions of policy deal with future action. Nothing has yet occurred. **The entire debate is about whether something ought to occur**. What you agree to do, then, when you accept the affirmative side in such a debate is to offer sufficient and compelling reasons for an audience to perform the future action that you propose.

***Clash is the biggest impact in the round and internally link turns their pedagogy – the Neg’s ability to contest Aff claims improves BOTH TEAMS’ knowledge.***

**O’Donnell 4** – PhD, director of debate at Mary Washington (Tim, WFU Debaters Research Guide, "Blue helmet blues", ed. Bauschard %26 Lacy, http://groups.wfu.edu/debate/MiscSites/DRGArticles/DRGArtiarticlesIndex.htm)

The answer, I believe, resides deep in the rhetorical tradition in the often overlooked notion of stasis. Although the concept can be traced to Aristotle’s Rhetoric, it was later expanded by Hermagoras whose thinking has come down to us through the Roman rhetoricians Cicero and Quintillian. **Stasis is a Greek word meaning to “stand still.” It has generally been considered by argumentation scholars to be the point of clash where two opposing sides meet in argument**. **Stasis recognizes the fact that interlocutors engaged in a conversation, discussion, or debate need to have some level of expectation regarding what the focus of their encounter ought to be**. **To reach stasis, participants need to arrive at a decision about what the issue is prior to the start of their conversation**. Put another way, **they need to mutually acknowledge the point about which they disagree.**

**What happens when participants fail to reach agreement about what it is that they are arguing about? They talk past each other with little or no awareness of what the other is saying**. The oft used cliché of two ships passing in the night, where both are in the dark about what the other is doing and neither stands still long enough to call out to the other, is the image most commonly used to describe what happens when participants in an argument fail to achieve stasis. **In such situations, genuine engagement is not possible because participants have not reached agreement about what is in dispute**. For example, when one advocate says that the United States should increase international involvement in the reconstruction of Iraq and their opponent replies that the United States should abandon its policy of preemptive military engagement, they are talking past each other. **When such a situation prevails, it is hard to see how a productive conversation can ensue.**

I do not mean to suggest that dialogic engagement always unfolds along an ideal plain where participants always can or even ought to agree on a mutual starting point. The reality is that many do not. In fact, refusing to acknowledge an adversary’s starting point is itself a powerful strategic move. However, it must be acknowledged that **when such situations arise, and participants cannot agree on the issue about which they disagree, the chances that their exchange will result in a productive outcome are diminished significantly**. **In an enterprise like academic debate, where the goals of the encounter are cast along both educational and competitive lines, the need to reach accommodation on the starting point is urgent.** **This is especially the case when time is limited and there is no possibility of extending the clock. The sooner such agreement is achieved, the better. Stasis helps us understand that we stand to lose a great deal when we refuse a genuine starting point.**

### K

#### The central question of this debate is whose politics best creates a radical break with capitalism—the 1AC’s focus on particular identities oppressed under colonialism reduces capitalism to just one of a set of antagonisms and causes endless subdivision of political demands which dangerously distracts from revolutionary politics proper—this round is a question of starting points—the perm can never be truly radical because the 1AC’s particular focus has always already ceded the universal

Bjerre & Lausten ’10 Henrik Jøker Bjerre is Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy and History of Ideas, Aarhus University, Denmark. His main research interests are moral philosophy, sociology and psychoa - nalysis. His publications include Kantian Deeds (Continuum, 2010). Carsten Bagge Laustsen is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Denmark. His main research interests are terrorism, political theology, political thought and modern social theory. He has previously published The Culture of Exception. Sociology Facing the Camp (Routledge, 2005, with Bülent Diken) and Sociology through the Projector (Routledge, 2008, with Bülent Diken). Humanities Insights : The Subject of Politics : Slavoj Žižek’s Political Philosophy. Penrith, GBR: Humanities-Ebooks, LLP, 2010. p 96-99. Copyright © 2010. Humanities-Ebooks, LLP. All rights reserved. <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/wayne/Doc?id=10567330&ppg=20>, accessed via e-book @ Wayne State, online, jj

If we focus on Western societies for a moment again, which super - structure fits late modern capitalism best? The answer must be post - modern identity politics. The politics of identity has as a central fea-ture exactly the repression of the class perspective, which in turn implies that the endless amounts of particular identity struggles remain busy solving problems. They fight to reduce suffering, but the background of it cannot be addressed adequately within the political frame of identity politics. We can therefore place identity politics and multiculturalism in a broader, political context: So we are fighting our PC battles for the right of ethnic minor - ities, of gays and lesbians, of different lifestyles, and so forth, while capitalism pursues its triumphant march – and today’s critical theory, in the guise of ‘cultural studies’, is perform - ing the ultimate service for the unrestrained development of capitalism by actively participating in the ideological effort to render its massive presence invisible: in the predominant form of postmodern ‘cultural criticism’, the very mention of capitalism as a world system tends to give rise to accusations of ‘essentialism’, ‘fundamentalism’, and so on. The price of this depoliticization of the economy is that the domain of pol - itics itself is in a way depoliticized: political struggle proper is transformed into the cultural struggle for the recognition of marginal identities and the tolerance of differences. (Žižek 1999: 218) The class and commodity structure of capitalism is overdetermining society as a whole, and it is this overdetermination which identity politics is repressing. ‘Class antagonism certainly appears as one in the series of social antagonisms, but it is simultaneously the specific antagonism which predominates over the rest, whose relations thus assign rank and influence to the others. It is a general illumination which bathes all the other colours and modifies their particularity.’ (Žižek 2000c: 320). Identity politics reduces the question concerning economy to one among several questions on an equal level. Two fatal consequences follow from this. Firstly, the narratives about a trans - formation from an essentialist Marxism to a postmodern Marxism hide the fact that this break with essentialism relates to an actual his - torical process. The multitude and non-essentialist manifold which is celebrated by the new left is something which has fundamentally only become possible through capital’s constant transgression of its own limits. Secondly, and related to the former point, the focus on particular struggles means that one gives up any serious attempt at transgress - ing capitalism. When Laclau and others with him give the reader a choice between class struggle (Marxism) or postmodernity (iden - tity politics), then the problem is not only that they make the wrong choice (i.e. deny Marxism), but also, and more fundamentally, that they do not see that capital itself has become postmodern. And fur - ther, that there is a speculative connection between capitalism and postmodern identity politics. The latter serves postmodern capitalism as its perfect superstructure. The passage from ‘essentialist’ Marxism to postmodern con - tingent politics (in Laclau), or the passage from sexual essen - tialism to contingent gender-formation (in Butler), or – a fur - ther example – the passage from metaphysician to ironist in Richard Rorty, is not a simple epistemological progress but part of the global change in the very nature of capitalist soci - ety. (Žižek 2000a: 106) The central question after this conclusion becomes one over the kind of politics that makes possible a break with capitalism, and this is where Žižek turns to Marxism for a way to think revolutionary change. We earlier defined the political as the process in which par - ticular demands are elevated from being an expression of particular interests to being demands of a universal restructuring of the societal order. Postmodern identity politics on this background appears to be fundamentally apolitical. It is exactly characterised by the caretaking of particular interests, and this is not fundamentally changed by form - ing rainbow coalitions or the like. What these ‘policies’ basically do, and this is what makes them reactionary, is to reinforce already exist - ing social positions (Žižek 1999: 208). The lack of a focus on econ - omy in postmodern identity politics means that it is simply not politi - cal enough. The critique against economic essentialism turns into a prohibition on making the function of economy a theme at all, which in turn means that the new left, exemplified by Laclau, Butler, and Rorty, are not capable of distinguishing between the contingency that is made possible within a given order and the exclusions on which this order rests (Žižek 2000a: 108). The right to narrate, which is the point of departure of identity politics, is blocking the universalisation of specific demands. We have already discussed that. But there are other problems as well. Identity politics is morally blind. Yes, all ‘progressives’ support the rights of gays and lesbians. But what about the right of bikers to their lifestyle – driving Harleys really fast, being tattooed and controlling drug sales. Should young guests in night clubs have a right to take drugs – this is a kind of lifestyle as well, isn’t it? Do parents have a right to circumcise their daughters if it is part of their tradition to do so? Or should the Nazis have a right to march through town, spread propaganda and recruit young supporters? Identity politics seems to be able to legitimise anything, which is why Žižek opts for Lenin and the right to truth rather than the right to narrate (Žižek 2002b: 177). Capital treats life forms as a colonial master treats the natives: they are studied carefully and respected. Moral involvement is never at stake – one could rather speak of indifference. Another problem is that there is no limit to the particularisation of demands and thereby the division of groups that need special treat - ment: lesbians, Afro-American lesbians, Afro-American lesbian mothers, Afro-American lesbian single mothers… Where does this sub-division end? ‘Postmodernists’ do not seem to have an answer for that. Žižek does. It stops precisely where the particular demands can no longer be universalised. The issue is not how specific a group and its demands are, but whether these may serve as a radical criti - cism of a given formation or not (Žižek 1999: 203– 204). What also seems to be forgotten is that anti-essentialism and relativism make for a position of strength, i.e. a position that can only be taken from a privileged, distanced position of supervision. It is the position from which all substantial positioning can be dismissed as essentialism, fundamentalism, primitivism, dogmatism or similar ‘isms’. The antiessentialist position is imagined to be an unprejudiced, neutral posi - tion. But this ‘neutrality’ is fake. It is a kind of ‘universalism’ which in reality supports only one given and particular societal order – cap - italism (Žižek 2001d: 103). The reference to objectively given eco - nomic limitations or ‘Development’ as it is called today seems to be the card that trumps everything. If it is played, there seems to be no way around adjusting and renouncing. Žižek’s strategy is to change the rules of the game so that such trumps lose their significance.

#### The aff is wasted energy – fighting particular battles without changing the way the economy works means nothing really changes – the aff just obscures the logic of capitalism

**Zizek, ’99** (Slavoj, Senior Researcher and professor at the Institute for Social Studies, Ljubljana, The Ticklish Subject, page 352-355)

The big news of today’s post-political age of the ‘end of ideology’ is thus the radical depoliticization of the sphere of the economy: the way the economy functions (the need to cut social welfare, etc.) is accepted as a simple insight into the objective state of things. However, as long as this fundamental depoliticization of the economic sphere is accepted, all the talk about active citizenship, about public discussion leading to responsible collective decisions, and so on, will remain limited to the ‘cultural’ issues of religious, sexual, ethnic and other way-of-life differences, without actually encroaching upon the level at which long-term decisions that affect us all are made. In short, the only way effectively to bring about a society in which risky long-term decisions would ensue from public debate involving all concerned is some kind of radical limitation of Capital’s freedom, the subordinated of the process of production to social control – the radical repoliticization of the economy. That is to say: if the problem with today’s post-politics (‘administration of social affairs’) is that it increasingly undermines the possibility of a proper political act, this undermining is directly due to the depoliticization of economics, to the common acceptance of Capital and market mechanisms as neutral tools/ procedures to be exploited. We can now see why today’s post-politics cannot attain the properly political dimension of universality; because it silently precludes the sphere of economy from politicization. The domain of global capitalist market relations in the Other Scene of the so-called repoliticization of civil society advocated by the partisans of ‘identity politics’ and other postmodern forms of politicization: all the talk about new forms of politics bursting out all over, focused on particular issues (gay rights, ecology, ethnic minorities…), all this incessant activity of fluid, shifting identities, of building multiple ad hoc coalitions, and so on, has something inauthentic about it, and ultimately resembles the obsessional neurotic who talks all the time and is otherwise frantically active precisely in order to ensure that something – what really matters – will *not* be disturbed, that it will remain immobilized. 35 So, instead of celebrating the new freedoms and responsibilities brought about by the ‘second modernity’, it is much more crucial to focus on what remains the same in this global fluidity and reflexivity, on what serves as the very motor of this fluidity: the inexorable logic of Capital. The spectral presence of Capital is the figure of the big Other which not only remains operative when all the traditional embodiments of the symbolic big Other disintegrate, but even directly causes this disintegration: far from being confronted with the abyss of their freedom – that is, laden with the burden of responsibility that cannot be alleviated by the helping hand of Tradition or Nature – today’s subject is perhaps more than ever caught in an inexorable compulsion that effectively runs his life.

#### The 1AC implores you to “think and act from where we are.” This is antithetical to anti-capitalist resistance. Grounding politics in social location prevents comprehensive analysis of SOCIAL RELATIONS as a totality—causes a “snapshot” approach to understanding oppression that blocks class struggle

* snapshot

Susan Ferguson ’08, is Assistant Professor in the Journalism Program at the Wilfrid Laurier University, Brantford Campus. Her previous work on feminist theory and politics explores the development of the social reproduction framework in the Canadian context. Current research interests include applying that framework to media and children's culture. Race, Gender & Class: Volume 15, Number 1-2, 2008 (42-57), CANADIAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIAL REPRODUCTION FEMINISM, RACE AND EMBODIED LABOR, <http://davidmcnally.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Race-Gender-Class.pdf>, jj

Early attempts to develop a materialist, anti-racist feminism from a Marxian perspective foundered on the rocky shores of structuralism and economic reductionism—their end signaled in Heidi Hartmann’s 1979 critique, “The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism.” Many years later, and only after a detour through a postmodern, Foucauldian landscape, progressive feminists have embraced a new comprehensive materialist approach, intersectionality. Insisting that any given social moment embodies a historically specific nexus of institutionalized relations of class, race, gender, etc., intersectionality overcomes many of the weaknesses associated with early Marxist feminism. Most importantly, it shifts the goal of analysis away from isolating and 2 ranking particular forms of oppression, and toward interrogating the manner in which they reinforce and/or contradict one another in and through people’s lived experiences. This has the decided merit of exploring subjectivities, of focusing analysis on people’s lives, not just abstract categories of race, gender and class. Yet, as Johanna Brenner argues, scholars who have adopted an intersectional perspective tend to limit their field of inquiry. They usually set out to describe and explain how specified social locations shape experience and identity, rather than to understand how such locations interact as part of a dynamic set of social relations. Such a snapshot approach doesn’t adequately probe the question of capitalism as a social power—the question, that is, of how processes, ideas and institutions associated with race, gender and class act upon each other to both reproduce and challenge the exclusions, inequality and exploitation characteristic of capitalist class societies. As a result, they often leave capitalist relations of social power, and resistance to that power under-theorized (Brenner, 2000:293).

#### Only the alt’s holistic focus on social relations rather than particular locations can create unified resistance

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When Brenner critiques intersectionality for its focus on social location as opposed to social relations, she is pointing out that many intersectional analyses fail to connect their descriptively rich accounts to that broader “unity.” Identifying nexuses of oppression and probing their inner workings has the advantage of “starting from experience,” and thus is a clear advance on structuralist political economy. But the most such analyses can do is highlight similarities and differences amongst discrete instances of oppression, and explain those oppressions in terms of contingent economic and cultural forces (state policies, policing practices, or the culture of whiteness, for example). To move beyond this, as Bannerji suggests, involves investigating how these experiences are socially mediated—that is, the way in which various social locations arise in a shared social space, a space shaped by certain colonial capitalist exigencies. A revised and expanded SRF framework conceptualizes those intersectional nexuses as products of labor—of creative activity undertaken to reproduce ourselves within this shared space. This, in turn, highlights not only the ways in which we partake in a broader set of social relations—relations that, because of the alienated form of much of our labor, often end up dominating us—but also the embodied nature of that activity, the biophysical differentiation and spatial location of the laboring body that, under conditions of capitalist reproduction, inscribe that body with both gender and race. As a result, real and systemic connections between the endlessly varied struggles of the oppressed become apparent, between, for instance, a childcare worker strike in Vancouver, the struggle to protect schooling for girls in Kabul and the environmental movement against mega-dams along India’s River Narmada.

#### Focus on standpoint epistemology negates analysis of material conditions—it’s neoliberal identity politics par excellance—undermines solidarity of the proletariat

Varn & Curcio ’13, C. DERICK VARN, Jasmine Curcio is a scholar and feminist activist in Melbourne, Australia., 4-16-’13, The North Star, Materialism and Patriarchy: An Interview with Jasmine Curcio, <http://www.thenorthstar.info/?p=8502>, jj

Standpoint epistemology in its idealist, identity-politic formation is often used to negate any materialist analysis and sound standpoint epistemology based in materialist analysis of systems which in part intersect, but that latter meaning of intersection is not the essence of “intersectionality.” Intersectionality is concerned with the intersection of varied identities, atomized and particular, from supposedly immediate experience, with no real or primary understanding of consciousness and thus identity being formed by systems, as it has eschewed such an understanding. It becomes, in intersection with liberal privilege discourse, part of the ideological repertoire of neoliberal identity politics. And the understanding, if not the assumption, that oppression lives in individual behaviors, hence the isolate concepts of “privilege” divorced from any real understanding of what a system of oppression entails (it is not the mere sum of “privileges”), but described with respect to individual actions and perceptions in the first person. Such things are useful as an educational guide pointing beyond itself to something larger, but that is often not the case.

C.D.V.: I have heard standpoint epistemology linked to a Marxian analysis of social awareness. Why do you think standpoint epistemology tends towards idealism?

J.C.: I do not think it is all standpoint epistemology which is idealist; rather for any standpoint epistemology to truly make sense it must be anchored in the material. Let’s take a classic example, Georg Lukács in History and Class Consciousness. He defines class consciousness as “consist[ing] in fact of the appropriate and rational reactions ‘imputed’ to a particular typical position in the process of production.” So already we have a material situation from which class consciousness, whether false or true, can be examined, with respect to any economic class and its activity in history. So, the proletariat, due to its unique position, has the potential to view the social totality of capitalism and have the power to demolish capitalism.

Let’s take this to feminism. Women, due to their position in the patriarchal system and undergoing objectification and appropriation, have the unique potential to view patriarchal society, and can often see the operations of the masculine gender construct better than most men can in their state of false consciousness, and the same with people of color in a racist system. But I do want to address the idealist tendency here.

There appears to be a sort of liberal appropriation of this materialist standpoint epistemology and divesting it of its concretion. Without an understanding of a materialist system, of course, what one is left with is pure subjective consciousness, but no notion of a system of oppression, of social forces shaping individuals. It is just a pure abstract standpoint that can be taken by almost any subject, whose legitimacy is granted by its mere subjectivity and the appearance of the phenomena they describe. This has been taken in recent years by liberal activists, such as pro-sex-work, self-defined “sex workers.” And their perspective has some presumed sovereignty, and is entirely unrelated to a comprehensive systemic understanding of patriarchy, because to admit of such a thing and its effect would nullify the preciously constructed identity of the “empowered sex worker,” as the knowledge of one’s construction and mediation by patriarchal social forces would certainly ruin the high sustained on male attention and praise. To inform them of De Beauvoir’s distinction between prostitutes and hetairas (usually high-class, women who consider their entire selves capital to be exploited, and experience a curious narcissism in their false consciousness of their state of dependency), produces a great deal of anger in the undermining of their identity.

So basically, standpoint epistemology can only be made to make sense within the understanding of a material system of oppression. When divorced from that, it is as abstractly idealist as one can imagine. Indeed, it is an integral part of liberal identity politics which eschews any systemic understanding, substituting it with one-dimensional perceptions that cannot integrate into a comprehensive social totality but clash with other identities, which can at best intersect with each other. Truth becomes something enclosed within individuals who view themselves as a socially-impermeable identity category, which undermines real solidarity and connection with others, as the logic of identity politics is atomizing.

#### Vote neg on ethics - resisting this reliance on economic evaluation is the ultimate ethical responsibility

**Zizek and Daly** 20**04**

(Slavoj, professor of philosophy at the Institute for Sociology, Ljubljana, and Glyn, Senior Lecturer in Politics in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences at University College, Northampton, Conversations with Zizek, page 14-16)

For Zizek it is imperative that we cut through this Gordian knot of postmodern protocol and recognize that our ethico-political responsibility is to confront the constitutive violence of today’s global capitalism and its obscene naturalization / anonymization of the millions who are subjugated by it throughout the world. Against the standardized positions of postmodern culture – with all its pieties concerning ‘multiculturalist’ etiquette – Zizek is arguing for a politics that might be called ‘radically incorrect’ in the sense that it break with these types of positions 7 and focuses instead on the very organizing principles of today’s social reality: the principles of global liberal capitalism. This requires some care and subtlety. For far too long, Marxism has been bedeviled by an almost fetishistic economism that has tended towards political morbidity. With the likes of Hilferding and Gramsci, and more recently Laclau and Mouffee, crucial theoretical advances have been made that enable the transcendence of all forms of economism. In this new context, however, Zizek argues that the problem that now presents itself is almost that of the opposite fetish. That is to say, the prohibitive anxieties surrounding the taboo of economism can function as a way of not engaging with economic reality and as a way of implicitly accepting the latter as a basic horizon of existence. In an ironic Freudian-Lacanian twist, the fear of economism can end up reinforcing a de facto economic necessity in respect of contemporary capitalism (i.e. the initial prohibition conjures up the very thing it fears). This is not to endorse any kind of retrograde return to economism. Zizek’s point is rather that in rejecting economism we should not lose sight of the systemic power of capital in shaping the lives and destinies of humanity and our very sense of the possible. In particular we should not overlook Marx’s central insight that in order to create a universal global system the forces of capitalism seek to conceal the politico-discursive violence of its construction through a kind of gentrification of that system. What is persistently denied by neo-liberals such as Rorty (1989) and Fukuyama (1992) is that the gentrification of global liberal capitalism is one whose ‘universalism’ fundamentally reproduces and depends upon a disavowed violence that excludes vast sectors of the world’s populations. In this way, neo-liberal ideology attempts to naturalize capitalism by presenting its outcomes of winning and losing as if they were simply a matter of chance and sound judgment in a neutral market place. Capitalism does indeed create a space for a certain diversity, at least for the central capitalist regions, but it is neither neutral nor ideal and its price in terms of social exclusion is exorbitant. That is to say, the human cost in terms of inherent global poverty and degraded ‘life-chances’ cannot be calculated within the existing economic rationale and, in consequence, social exclusion remains mystified and nameless (viz. the patronizing reference to the ‘developing world’). And Zizek’s point is that this mystification is magnified through capitalism’s profound capacity to ingest its own excesses and negativity: to redirect (or misdirect) social antagonisms and to absorb them within a culture of differential affirmation. Instead of Bolshevism, the tendency today is towards a kind of political boutiquism that is readily sustained by postmodern forms of consumerism and lifestyle. Against this Zizek argues for a new universalism whose primary ethical directive is to confront the fact that our forms of social existence are founded on exclusion on a global scale. While it is perfectly true that universalism can never become Universal (it will always require a hegemonic-particular embodiment in order to have any meaning), what is novel about Zizek’s universalism is that it would not attempt to conceal this fact or reduce the status of the abject Other to that of a ‘glitch’ in an otherwise sound matrix.

#### This is not a meaningless question – the structures of capitalism are driving multiple large-scale processes that are increasingly out of the control of individuals living their lives. Global warming, multiple wars of accumulation, loss of land and income stratification: all of these are making life unlivable.

Parr ’13 (Adrian, Assoc. Prof. of Philosophy and Environmental Studies @ U. of Cincinnati, *THE WRATH OF CAPITAL: Neoliberalism and Climate Change Politics*, pp. 145-147)

A quick snapshot of the twenty-first century so far: an economic meltdown; a frantic sell-off of public land to the energy business as President George W Bush exited the White House; a prolonged, costly, and unjustified war in Iraq; the Greek economy in ruins; an escalation of global food prices; bee colonies in global extinction; 925 million hungry reported in 2010; as of 2005, the world's five hundred richest individuals with a combined income greater than that of the poorest 416 million people, the richest 10 percent accounting for 54 percent of global income; a planet on the verge of boiling point; melting ice caps; increases in extreme weather conditions; and the list goes on and on and on.2 Sounds like a ticking time bomb, doesn't it? Well it is.

It is shameful to think that massive die-outs of future generations will put to pale comparison the 6 million murdered during the Holocaust; the millions killed in two world wars; the genocides in the former Yugoslavia, Rwanda, and Darfur; the 1 million left homeless and the 316,000 killed by the 2010 earthquake in Haiti. The time has come to wake up to the warning signs.3

The real issue climate change poses is that we do not enjoy the luxury of incremental change anymore. We are in the last decade where we can do something about the situation. Paul Gilding, the former head of Greenpeace International and a core faculty member of Cambridge University's Programme for Sustainability, explains that "two degrees of warming is an inadequate goal and a plan for failure;' adding that "returning to below one degree of warming . . . is the solution to the problem:'4 Once we move higher than 2°C of warming, which is what is projected to occur by 2050, positive feedback mechanisms will begin to kick in, and then we will be at the point of no return. We therefore need to start thinking very differently right now.

We do not see the crisis for what it is; we only see it as an isolated symptom that we need to make a few minor changes to deal with. This was the message that Venezuela's president Hugo Chavez delivered at the COP15 United Nations Climate Summit in Copenhagen on December 16, 2009, when he declared: "Let's talk about the cause. We should not avoid responsibilities, we should not avoid the depth of this problem. And I'll bring it up again, the cause of this disastrous panorama is the metabolic, destructive system of the capital and its model: capitalism.”5

The structural conditions in which we operate are advanced capitalism. Given this fact, a few adjustments here and there to that system are not enough to solve the problems that climate change and environmental degradation pose.6 Adaptability, modifications, and displacement, as I have consistently shown throughout this book, constitute the very essence of capitalism. Capitalism adapts without doing away with the threat. Under capitalism, one deals with threat not by challenging it, but by buying favors from it, as in voluntary carbon-offset schemes. In the process, one gives up on one's autonomy and reverts to being a child. Voluntarily offsetting a bit of carbon here and there, eating vegan, or recycling our waste, although well intended, are not solutions to the problem, but a symptom of the free market's ineffectiveness. By casting a scathing look at the neoliberal options on display, I have tried to show how all these options are ineffective. We are not buying indulgences because we have a choice; choices abound, and yet they all lead us down one path and through the golden gates of capitalist heaven.

For these reasons, I have underscored everyone's implication in this structure – myself included. If anything, the book has been an act of outrage – outrage at the deceit and the double bind that the "choices" under capitalism present, for there is no choice when everything is expendable. There is nothing substantial about the future when all you can do is survive by facing the absence of your own future and by sharing strength, stamina, and courage with the people around you. All the rest is false hope.

In many respects, writing this book has been an anxious exercise because I am fully aware that reducing the issues of environmental degradation and climate change to the domain of analysis can stave off the institution of useful solutions. But in my defense I would also like to propose that each and every one of us has certain skills that can contribute to making the solutions that we introduce in response to climate change and environmental degradation more effective and more realistic. In light of that view, I close with the following proposition, which I mean in the most optimistic sense possible: our politics must start from the point that after 2050 it may all be over.

#### Modern Racism and colonialism is no longer based on ideologies of cultural or natural superiority - economic egotism is the root of modern coloniality

Zizek 2008 Slavoj Violence p 101-104

But we are not dealing here only with good old racism. Something more is at stake: a fundamental feature of our emerging “global” society. On ii September 2001 the Twin Towers were hit. Twelve years earlier, on 9 November 1989, the Berlin Wall fell. That date heralded the “happy ‘9os,” the Francis Fukuyama dream of the “end of history” —the belief that liberal democracy had, in principle, won; that the search was over; that the advent of a global, liberal world community lurked just around the corner; that the obstacles to this ultra-Hollywood happy ending were merely empirical and contingent (local pockets of resistance where the leaders did not yet grasp that their time was up). In contrast, 9/11 is the main symbol of the end of the Clintonite happy ‘9os. This is the era in which new walls emerge everywhere, between Israel and the West Bank, around the European Union, on the U.S.—Mexico border. The rise of the populist New Right is just the most prominent example of the urge to raise new walls. A couple of years ago, an ominous decision of the European Union passed almost unnoticed: the plan to establish an all-European border police force to secure the isolation of Union territory and thus to prevent the influx of immigrants. *This* is the truth of globalisation: the construction of new walls safeguarding prosperous Europe from the immigrant flood. One is tempted to resuscitate here the old Marxist “humanist” opposition of “relations between things” and “relations between persons”: in the much-celebrated free circulation opened up by global capitalism, it is “things” (commodities) which freely circulate, while the circulation of “persons” is more and more controlled. We are not dealing now with “globalisation” as an unfinished project but with a true “dialectics of globalisation”: the segregation of the people *is* the reality of economic globalisation. This new racism of the developed is in a way much more brutal than the previous ones: its implicit legitimisation is neither naturalist (the “natural” superiority of the developed West) nor any longer culturalist (we in the West also want to preserve our cultural identity), but unabashed economic egotism. The fundamental divide is one between those included in the sphere of (relative) economic prosperity and those excluded from it.

#### Our alternative is to organize politics around unconditional resistance to capitalism & refuse the 1AC’s evacuation of universalism. This is a question of non-permutable starting points; only prior critical interrogation of economic relations lays the groundwork for radical politics

* Individualism warrant

**McLaren ‘06** (Peter, University of California, “Slavoj Žižek's Naked Politics: Opting for the Impossible, A Secondary Elaboration”, JAC, <http://www.jacweb.org/Archived_volumes/Text_articles/V21_I3_McLaren.htm>, jj)

Žižek challenges the relativism of the gender-race-class grid of reflexive positionality when he claims that class antagonism or struggle is not simply one in a series of social antagonisms—race, class, gender, and so on—but rather constitutes the part of this series that sustains the horizon of the series itself. In other words, class struggle is the specific antagonism that assigns rank to and modifies the particularities of the other antagonisms in the series. He notes that "the economy is at one and the same time the genus and one of its own species" (*Totalitarianism* 193). In what I consider to be his most important work to date, *Contingency, Hegemony, Universality* (coauthored with Judith Butler and Ernesto Laclau), Žižek militantly refuses to evacuate reference to historical structures of totality and universality and argues that class struggle itself enables the proliferation of new political subjectivities (albeit subjectivities that ironically relegate class struggle to a secondary role). As Marx argued, class struggle structures "in advance" the very terrain of political antagonisms. Thus, according to Žižek, class struggle is not "the last horizon of meaning, the last signified of all social phenomena, but the formal generative matrix of the different ideological horizons of understanding" ("Repeating" 16-17). In his terms, class struggle sets the ground for the empty place of universality, enabling it to be filled variously with contents of different sorts (ecology, feminism, anti-racism). He further argues that the split between the classes is even more radical today than during the times of industrial class divisions. He takes the position that post-Marxists have done an excellent job in uncovering the fantasy of capital (vis-à-vis the endless deferral of pleasure) but have done little to uncover its reality. Those post-Marxists who are advocates of new social movements (such as Laclau and Mouffe) want revolution without revolution; in contrast, Žižek calls for movements that relate to the larger totality of capitalist social relations and that challenge the very matter and antimatter of capital's social universe. His strategic focus on capitalist exploitation (while often confusing and inconsistent) rather than on racial, ethnic, gender, or sexual identity is a salutary one: "The problem is not how our precious particular identity should be kept safe from global capitalism. The problem is how to oppose global capitalism at an even more radical level; the problem is to oppose it universally, not on a particular level. This whole problematic is a false one" (Olson and Worsham 281). What Žižek sets himself against is the particular experience or political argument. An experience or argument that cannot be universalized is "always and by definition a conservative political gesture: ultimately everyone can evoke his unique experience in order to justify his reprehensible acts" ("Repeating" 4-5). Here he echoes Wood, who argues that capitalism is "not just another specific oppression alongside many others but an all-embracing compulsion that imposes itself on all our social relations" ("Identity" 29). He also echoes critical educators such as Paulo Freire, who argues against the position that experiences of the oppressed speak for themselves. All experiences need to be interrogated for their ideological assumptions and effects, regardless of who articulates them or from where they are lived or spoken. They are to be read with, against, and upon the scientific concepts produced by the revolutionary Marxist tradition. The critical pedagogical act of interro-gating experiences is not to pander to the autonomous subject or to individualistic practices but to see those experiences in relationship to the structure of social antagonisms and class struggle. History has not discharged the educator from the mission of grasping the "truth of the present" by interrogating all the existing structures of exploitation present within the capitalist system where, at the point of production, material relations characterize relations between people and social relations characterize relations between things. The critical educator asks: How are individuals historically located in systematic structures of economic relations? How can these structures—these lawless laws of capital—be overcome and transformed through revolutionary praxis into acts of freely associated labor where the free development of each is the condi-tion for the free development of all?

### Case

#### Bad Forum – using the classroom as a site to decolonize thought oversimplifies the Western-Indigenous relationship and history, is counter-productive, and creates a close minded dichotomy between primitivism and modernity which turns their project.

Nakata et al 2012, N. Martin Nakata, Victoria Nakata, Sarah Keech & Reuben Bolt

Nura Gili Centre for Indigenous Programs, University of New South Wales, Australia, “Decolonial goals and pedagogies for Indigenous studies,” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, <http://decolonization.org/index.php/des/article/view/18629>, KEL

A number of points are threaded through our argument. We agree that anti-colonial critique is a fundamental beginning point for unsettling entry-level students’ presuppositions about Indigenous-Western relations. However we argue that the end-point of instating regenerated Indigenous ‘ways’ or ‘traditions’ as the counter-solution to overcoming colonial legacies occurs too hurriedly in some scholarly analysis and in lecture settings. In this process, explorations in lecture rooms skip the more complex theoretical dilemmas students need to engage with to understand the conceptual limits of their own thinking, as well as the discipline’s, and to critically engage propositions from within Indigenous Studies scholarship. Our stance also leads us away from approaches that focus on decolonising students. Approaches that focus on changing students’ thinking through constant engagement with or reflection on their complicity with colonialism, its knowledge, and its privileges personalises a deep political and knowledge contest in ways that can be counter-productive for both students and their educational goals. Our argument is that the complex grounds of this ‘Indigenous-Western’ contest make it a difficult task to resolve what is colonial and what is Indigenous, or what ultimately serves Indigenous interests in contemporary knowledge practice. Furthermore, the quest to resolve this contest in lecture rooms relies on engaging students in an oversimplification of the way colonial, Western, and Indigenous meanings are produced and operate in contemporary lifeworlds. We propose that students might be more disposed to understanding the limits of their own thinking by engaging in open, exploratory, and creative inquiry in these difficult intersections, while building language and tools for describing and analysing what they engage with. This approach engages the politics of knowledge production and builds critical skills — students’ less certain positions require the development of less certain, more complex analytical arguments and more intricate language to express these arguments. Pedagogically, we propose this as a way to also prevent slippage into forms of thinking and critical analysis that are confined within dichotomies between primitivism and modernity; and as a way to avoid the closed-mindedness of intellectual conformity, whether this be expressed in Indigenous, decolonial, or Western theorising.

#### Too Reductionist – their simplistic critique of all Western thought reifies colonial binaries and thought and prevents more important complex analysis, turning their case.

Nakata et al 2012, N. Martin Nakata, Victoria Nakata, Sarah Keech & Reuben Bolt

Nura Gili Centre for Indigenous Programs, University of New South Wales, Australia, “Decolonial goals and pedagogies for Indigenous studies,” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, <http://decolonization.org/index.php/des/article/view/18629>, KEL

In Indigenous Studies, simplistic critique of the Western has had a tendency toward reductive ideological critique in the effort to demonstrate political resistance as the path to Indigenous ‘liberation’ and re-affirmation of traditional identities2. By simplistic critique, we mean that which represents the Western in singular terms and antithetical to the Indigenous. This reflects, in part, the activism of the struggle for freedom, recognition, and self-determination. When coupled with the determination to affirm dynamically adapting cultural practices or to re-instate conceptual thought from Indigenous knowledge systems or ‘traditions’, Smith’s (1999) decolonising priority to re-claim, re-name, re-write and re-right is upheld. This approach is ideologically powerful in terms of the Indigenous sense of autonomy and distinctiveness. However, it runs the danger of reifying the colonial binaries, even though ‘deconstruction’ of them re-turns the negative binary into a positive force mobilised by re-generated Indigenous meanings. More importantly, political resistance that demands the routine dismissal of the Western, as colonial and as the singular originary source of Indigenous struggles, when coupled with the quick re-claiming and re-naming of the Indigenous, inhibits fuller, more measured examination of the complex layers of meaning that now circumscribe what it means to be Indigenous and how Indigenous contemporary social conditions and concerns can be understood (see, for example, Sutton, 2009).

#### Visibility is a Trap - Radical strategies of making visibility are part of sovereign violence. Their call for disobedience will be co-opted. If they are right that academia is bankrupt then there is only a potential for it to use their epistemic disobedience as ethnographic information.

Forte 2009 Maximilian C., Professor of Anthropology Montreal, May 22, and#34; Useless Anthropologyand#34;: Strategies for Dealing with the Militarization of the Academy « ZERO ANTHROPOLOGY, http://zeroanthropology.net/2009/05/22/%E2%80%9Cuseless-anthropology%E2%80%9D-strategies-for-dealing-with-the-militarization-of-the-academy/

One does not need to seek employment with the Pentagon, take part in counterinsurgency, or work for the Human Terrain System in order to provide useful, even if involuntary, support for the national security, intelligence and military goals of the U.S., or any NATO state for that matter. In fact, one does not even need to be an American anthropologist in order to provide the U.S. military and intelligence with the information they seek. One needs to simply produce useful anthropology and not be mindful of the consequences of how it can be used by unintended audiences, now or in the future, to support agendas of which one may have limited awareness and even less desire to support. With this and much more in mind, my ambition is to seek the creation of a useless anthropology, and while some would say I was always on the right track for achieving that, I think more of us need to share a goal of producing useless research, to make worthless contributions, and by useless I mean useless to power, to empire, to domination, to regimes of scrutiny and inspection of the periphery. And not just useless, but even toxic and repulsive to the scientists of conquest – an anthropology of both withdrawal and resistance, free of false dilemmas that work to support business as usual, willing to set fire to the crops we planted if it stops them from being harvested by the tyrant, liberating ourselves from being our own best hostages. The idea is to refuse further engagement with the international traffic in information and knowledge that supports the workings of empire, capital, and the state. In this presentation I seek to make three main points. First, to indicate some of the ways that all of us can be even unwillingly useful in supporting U.S. military and intelligence interests. Second, to reflect on the meaning of useful anthropology. Third, to point the way to possible alternatives, that could entail unthinking anthropology as we know it. With reference to the first point, Gerald Sider made the point that at this moment in history “there is no such thing as an innocent anthropology” (p. 43). We know now that the U.S. military and intelligence are looking for ways of incorporating scholars in producing a global surveillance net. One way is to bring social scientists on counterinsurgency and pacification missions. Another is to have them conduct analysis of stolen Iraqi documents (see here and here), or to conduct fieldwork in areas of emerging or potential threat and describe the radicalization process and ways of counteracting it, as part of the Pentagon’s Minerva Research Initiative, managed in partnership with the National Science Foundation. Another is to comb through open access electronic resources. And yet another is just to get everything for free, by scanning, copying, seizing any or all electronic devices or written records from researchers as they enter the United States whether returning home to the U.S., or just traveling through, U.S. Border Patrol and Customs agents can: scan and hold laptops indefinitely; they can make electronic copies of hard drives, flash drives, cellphones, iPods, pagers, beepers, video and audio tapes; and, they can seize papers, documents, books, pamphlets, or even litter. This is also true of Canada and the UK. Open access publishing, and publishing in electronic formats that are thus amenable to automated harvesting, is a critically important way that ethnographic data can be used by the national security state without the willing participation of researchers. “Intelligence does not have to be secret to be valuable!” says the website of the University of Military Intelligence, regarding open access resources, which takes us to Intelink-U, part of the U.S. Army’s Foreign Military Studies Office, emerging from the Open Source Information System which serves the US intelligence community with open source intelligence. Among Intelink-U’s subscriptions is the University of New Mexico’s Latin America Database, as well as EbscoHost Databases. The Foreign Military Studies office is also in the process of creating the World Basic Information Library (WBIL), which promotes the concept of “distance drilling” telling us that: “About 85% of requirements in the intelligence business can be met with open source, unclassified sources, and can be exploited by qualified military reservists working by telecommuting. The WBIL has remotely located reservists from all four branches of the service doing ‘virtual’ collection and production utilizing their home Personal Computers.” Also, the Information Operations Advisory Task Force states that it has a “requirement to provide US Forces [in] Afghanistan…with the capability to collect, analyze, and disseminate open source (i.e. sociological or anthropological) information.” With reference to the second point of this presentation, the bases for a useful anthropology, let us note that useful, objective, neutral, and scientific, are once again the buzzwords for an anthropology aligned with power, in the service of the national security state, while rhetorically attempting to move the militarization of the academy beyond the sphere of “politics”. Criticism is political; support is scientific. If you oppose military objectives, you are biased; if you provide practical knowledge, you are objective, and objective is good, just like machines are good. On the other hand, military interest in anthropology is to a significant extent the perhaps unintended outcome of anthropology’s success in marketing itself. The compulsion in this discipline, from the time before its institutionalization in universities, has been to market itself to power as a useful science, with valuable contributions to make, later boasting of the vital importance of ethnography as anthropology’s unique contribution, so much so that anthropology and ethnography are wrongly equated. We wanted the attention of elites, and now we’ve got it. The military is interested in both culture and ethnography. In an article in National Defense Magazine, we are told that “A deeper understanding of culture has become an official part of Marine Corps strategy.” Meanwhile, General William “KIP” Ward, Commander, United States Africa Command, said this about the Pentagon’s work in Africa: “A lot of activity goes on in the continent through our non-government organizations. Academia is involved. When I was in previous assignments, someone came to me and would talk about, well, ‘Ward, you need to get a cultural anthropologist on your team.’ I said, what! A cultural what? Anthropologist? To do what? Get out of here. Or, ‘Ward, you need to have someone to help you understand the human dimension. You need some human terrain analysis.’ I said, ‘what? Get out of here.’ But it’s important, and where do those skills, talents reside — academia.” But for more academics to be more useful, they need to get over certain twinges of moral compunction. In the minds of the state and military some of us have already reverted to being a tool of imperialism, assuming we were ever anything else. Not serving imperialism is routinely called “retreating from the world” by some. Montgomery McFate, the anthropology PhD who has been the most prominent spokesperson for the Human Terrain System, wrote in a military journal that, “Over the past 30 years, as a result of anthropologists’ individual career choices and the tendency toward reflexive self-criticism contained within the discipline itself, the discipline has become hermetically sealed within its Ivory Tower….anthropologists still prefer to study the ‘exotic and useless,’ in the words of A.L. Kroeber….The retreat to the Ivory Tower is also a product of the deep isolationist tendencies within the discipline.” (p. 28) She doesn’t stop there, unfortunately, she notes that, “frequently backed up by self-reflexive neo-Marxism, anthropology began a brutal process of self-flagellation, to a degree almost unimaginable to anyone outside the discipline….The turn toward postmodernism within anthropology exacerbated the tendency toward self-flagellation….(also) This movement away from descriptive ethnography has produced some of the worst writing imaginable.” (p. 28) In this regard, she merely echoes some of the conservative and often overwrought backlash within the discipline over this trend that it imagined to be postmodern, whatever that is, apparently being self-critical is evil. With reference to the third and final point of this presentation, looking for alternatives and options to cooptation, for less useful anthropologies, I was inspired by Sider’s ideas about how a partisan anthropology, done “to help the victims of currently intensifying inequalities,” might begin, and it would begin in “the design of fieldwork and in the context of understanding struggle” (p. 44). He advocates against interviews, against asking questions of so-called informants, and against any form of recording data. Asking questions, he notes, is a seemingly simple act that opens our work to use by those who seek to dominate and control the people we study (p. 45). There are other ways we can work, he says, less open, but not impervious, to subsequent manipulation. Other options include choosing research projects that, in the eyes of the national security state, are entirely useless, and to write up the results in very esoteric language, with ample self-criticism. Another option is do to more “research at home” either collaborating with persons who are not the subject of either a moral panic or some hyperbolic national security hysteria, or, producing critiques of the way elites exercise power and enforce inequalities and injustices. Another option is open source ethnography done online, to collaborate with the producers of online information of ethnographic value, remixing it so that it becomes problematic to military examination. Not publishing in open access formats is another option, especially once the work is not funded by a public agency, the argument that “the public has a right to the research it funded” vanishes into irrelevance. We can also imagine experimenting with forms of research communication that defy easy understanding and conventional requirements of the military planner’s database, such as fictionalized ethnographies; ethnographic poetry; open source cinema (see here also); theatrical coproductions, and so forth.

#### Mignolo’s Method is Flawed –

#### Mignolo Epistemology is flawed and contradictory – stems from misreading of Derridean difference

Michaelson and Shershow, 7

Scott Michaelsen and Scott Cutler Shershow Rethinking Border Thinking South Atlantic Quarterly Winter 2007 106(1): 39-60; doi:10.1215/003 82876-2006-014

Toward the end of The Darker Side, these three points of departure from ¶ Derrida become five. We will summarize this new list as briefly as possible ¶ before going on to consider more closely what we have already identified ¶ as the argument on which all these various claims depend. Mignolo now ¶ suggests, first, that his own work attempts “to go beyond the evolutionary ¶ model still dominant in the various histories of writing and from which ¶ Derrida did not completely escape” (Darker, 319). Second, he says he departs ¶ from Derrida by choosing as his central figure of analysis Elio Antonio de Nebrija, a Spanish humanist who wrote one of the first grammars of the ¶ Castilian language in the early sixteenth century, instead of Jean-Jacques ¶ Rousseau (whom Derrida reads in Of Grammatology as an exemplary figure ¶ of logocentrism). This is significant, Mignolo asserts (repeating the third ¶ point from the earlier list), because “for Nebrija the question of the letter ¶ was not related to the representation of the voice . . . but to the taming of ¶ the voice” (319). Third, he claims that “the example chosen [by Derrida] in ¶ his deconstruction of logocentrism remains within the tradition he deconstructs,” as opposed to Mignolo’s own study of “conflicting writing systems ¶ during the early colonial expansion” (319). Fourth, here stating baldly what ¶ we have identified as his central claim, Mignolo argues again “that Western ¶ logocentrism shows its limits when confronted with forms of knowledge ¶ and understanding built upon alternative philosophies of language, and ¶ alternative speaking practices and writing systems” (319). Finally, Mignolo ¶ points to an alleged difference between Derrida’s philosophical approach ¶ and the concerns of “a philologist and a comparatist” who is interested in ¶ “alternative forms of knowledge” (319–20).¶ Let us take a moment, since that is all it will take, to dispose of the first ¶ of these five new claims: the accusation that Derrida remains still somehow ¶ “inside” an evolutionary model of the history of writing. Such a claim ¶ betrays a fundamental misunderstanding of Derrida, whose early texts rigorously critique all teleological or evolutionary explanations in the human ¶ sciences. Indeed, Derrida repeatedly argues that any attempt to think rigorously about anything that goes “under the name of writing” must “get ¶ rid, among other ethnocentric presuppositions, . . . of a sort of graphic ¶ monogenetism that transforms all differences into divergences or delays, ¶ accidents or deviations.”5 As Margaret W. Ferguson observes, Mignolo is ¶ also mistaken when he reads the title of the first section of Derrida’s De la ¶ grammatologie, “L’Ecriture avant la letter” (“Writing before the Letter”), as ¶ meaning that “with the invention of the alphabet . . . alternative forms of ¶ writing were superseded.”6 Derrida’s text makes abundantly clear that this ¶ phrase is a kind of pun acknowledging both the point that Mignolo himself ¶ belabors (that prealphabetic forms of inscription should be understood as ¶ “writing”) and to denote the “trace” or “arche-writing” that precedes all ¶ inscription and that thus constitutes “a kind of writing before the letter.”7¶ The third and fifth points on Mignolo’s new list merely restate this overhasty accusation in slightly different form. It therefore suffices to observe ¶ that Derrida always acknowledges that both his examples and his own ¶ thought remain within the tradition he deconstructs, because there is no ¶ absolute “outside” to a logocentrism and a metaphysics that begin at the ¶ very dawn of all that one might call thought, consciousness, or experience. ¶ Deconstruction aspires at most to “reach the point of a certain exteriority in ¶ relation to the totality of the age of logocentrism” (Grammatology, 161), for ¶ it involves the rigorous interrogation of structures of thought from whose ¶ orbit one can never absolutely escape. Similarly, Mignolo’s opposition, in ¶ the second of these five claims, between “representing” or “taming” the ¶ voice is either a distinction without a difference or, perhaps, something ¶ even more problematic. As Derrida famously suggests, the European tendency to privilege speech over writing manifests a nostalgia for an imagined ¶ self-presence of the voice that writing dilutes or contaminates. At best, ¶ therefore, Mignolo’s third claim merely restates one more time that Amerindian and European signifying practices are fundamentally different: in ¶ this case, because Amerindian signification is said to be somehow wild and ¶ natural—still in need of “taming”—while European signification is said ¶ to be somehow domesticated. At worst, however, one must suspect that ¶ Mignolo’s claim itself springs from a kind of nostalgia for some unadulterated Amerindian “voice” § Marked 11:58 § imagined as not yet disturbed in the plenitude ¶ of its self-presence and self-possession.¶ As we have observed, this whole elaborate theoretical machinery depends on a single fundamental claim: that Amerindian systems of signification were so distinctively different as to escape the problems Derrida ¶ described under the term logocentrism. Even on the surface of it, such a ¶ claim is founded in a contradiction so simple and obvious as to have eluded ¶ Mignolo himself. On the one hand, Mignolo argues above all that these ¶ colonial subjects, who were declared to be a people “without writing” by ¶ their colonial conquerors (because they appeared to lack systems of phonetic or alphabetic inscription) in fact do possess a variety of practices that ¶ can meaningfully be called “writing.” In this sense, the Amerindians were ¶ culturally the same as their conquerors: their signifying systems were in no ¶ sense “primitive” and should not be understood as merely the earlier stages ¶ of some alleged progression toward alphabetic writing. On the other hand, ¶ Mignolo also argues that Amerindian signifying practices were in fact distinctively different from European ones, for their “writing” was neither a ¶ phonetic representation of speech nor understood as a privileged realm of ¶ memory and authority in the Western manner. Mignolo is thus trying, as ¶ it were, to have his difference and deny it too. He insists that Amerindians¶ did have writing, yet imagines the writing they had as one that escapes all ¶ of writing’s problems and that exists in the form of an untamed “voice” not ¶ yet contaminated by the letter.¶ The first half of this self-contradictory argument also merely echoes a ¶ traditional anthropological critique of “evolutionary” Eurocentric conceptions of culture. True enough, both the Renaissance colonialists and ¶ humanists whom Mignolo discusses, and later thinkers such as Rousseau ¶ and Hegel, always assume that alphabetic writing is the inevitable telos of ¶ human cultural progress. The other contributors to Writing without Words¶ frequently join Mignolo (and Derrida) in rightly critiquing such assumptions. For example, Elizabeth Hill Boone, the coeditor of the volume, ¶ deplores how “the denial of pictographic writing systems as ‘real writing’ ¶ has generally been accompanied by an insidious pejorative tone.”8 Boone, ¶ however, enlists Derrida’s critique of logocentrism as an ally in reclaiming ¶ the pictographic systems of pre-Columbian as legitimate forms of “writing.” What Boone calls the “semasiographic” writing systems of Mesoamerica do not primarily rely on a phonetic representation of speech and ¶ are “characterized by a high proportion of visual description,” but nevertheless, “like other iconic systems they also use some arbitrary conventions,” and “phonetic elements may be present—especially in personal ¶ names and place names” (18). As Derrida himself always argues, no system ¶ of writing is either purely phonetic or purely pictographic; and “‘phonetic’ and ‘nonphonetic’ are . . . never pure qualities of certain systems of ¶ writing, they are the abstract characteristics of typical elements, more or ¶ less numerous and dominant within all systems of signification in general” ¶ (Grammatology, 89). No departure from Derrida is therefore necessary to ¶ join Mignolo and his collaborators in this volume in simply concluding ¶ that, during the period of colonization, “the materiality and the ideology ¶ of Amerindian semiotic interactions were intermingled with or replaced ¶ by the materiality and ideology of Western reading and writing cultures” ¶ (Darker, 76) and that, in other words, European colonialists misinterpreted ¶ Amerindian practices in the light of their own cultural presuppositions, ¶ and imposed Western conceptions of writing on colonial subjects as part ¶ of a broader process of cultural and political subjugation.¶ But the second half of Mignolo’s self-contradictory double claim—that ¶ Amerindian systems of signification escape the problems of logocentrism—by no means follows from this conclusion. Consider, for example, ¶ how Boone suggests that one advantage of semasiographic systems is that ¶ “Aztec (Nahuatl-speaking) scribes from Central Mexico could . . . read the Mixtec histories of southern Oaxaca, giving them voice in their own language” (19). And she concludes:¶ One thing shared by all these indigenous New World systems is that ¶ they give accountability. Because they are permanent, or relatively so, ¶ they functioned for their societies to document and to establish ideas. ¶ As records, they are memory that can be inspected by others. The ¶ hieroglyphic text and the pictorial-iconic presentation could be read ¶ or interpreted by many people other than their creator. (22, emphases ¶ original)¶ One must join Boone here in highlighting, as definitive characteristics of ¶ any of these New World systems of inscription, the functions of accountability, memory, and interpretability. Such characteristics would pertain in ¶ even the relatively extreme case of the Peruvian quipus, insofar as their patterns of knots and cords functioned, in any sense, to record or document ¶ information (and even if, as some have claimed, these were no more than ¶ personal mnemonic devices). Similarly, Peter L. van der Loo, discussing in ¶ the same volume a pre-Columbian pictorial manuscript known as the Borgia Group, explains that “these manuscripts can be read as text. Because the ¶ message is put down in a pictorial mode, the actual spoken text may differ ¶ from reader to reader, but the main content of the message will remain the ¶ same to all.”9 As described here, this nonphonetic “writing” nevertheless ¶ is said to be linked to some semiotic “message” or “content” that both ¶ precedes and survives its inscription, that is reproducible as “voice” or ¶ “reading” in its wake, and that thus anchors or limits the varied readings or ¶ voicing of the inscribed signs. Is this, too, merely a Eurocentric misreading ¶ of pre-Columbian practices? Or is there, rather, no other way to “read” or ¶ to “write” except as a perpetually unfinished process of deferred presence? ¶ What else could this “content” or “voice” be than what Derrida calls the ¶ “trace,” the “arche-writing” that is “before the letter” not in some historical ¶ or evolutionary sense but, rather, as the mark of a consciousness and an ¶ “experience” lived only in signs and in time, and therefore in an interminable process of self-differing and self-deferring? As soon as there is, in any ¶ sense, record, account, or document, as soon as inscription of any kind offers ¶ itself as at once a supplement and a substitute for a memory that already ¶ supplements and substitutes for the trace, one is already, as these ethnographic descriptions themselves clearly attest, within the strange economy ¶ of what Derrida famously calls différance

#### Mignolo’s K of Western epistemology is tautological and backfires --- the Eurocentric frame can be liberatory

Alcoff 07 Linda Martín Alcoff, Syracuse University, CR: The New Centennial Review, Volume 7, Number 3, Winter 2007, Mignolo’s Epistemology of Coloniality, Project Muse, jj

But I would press Mignolo on two points. The first concerns his notion of truth. Mignolo rejects the project of reclaiming epistemology and advocates for the shift to gnoseology, because he sees epistemology as fundamentally a project that is pursuant of truth, and because he sees truth as necessarily imperial, territorial, and denotative. But it is difficult to interpret Mignolo’s own project in any way other than as a project concerned with truth and with [End Page 97] the way in which the colonial systems of knowing inhibited and precluded both the understanding and the identification of truth. The denotative approach might have limited application to the shift he has in mind, but there is still an epistemically based normative distinction operating in his critique of the coloniality of power.¶ Take for example Mignolo’s use of Glissant’s concept of diversality, a concept he contrasts to universality but also to plurality in which alternatives are not in active integration or interaction. Diversality maps differences as coconstitutive and as potentially integrated, in the way that a bicultural identity can shift between multiple frames of reference without collapsing the differences but also without organizing them into hierarchies. As opposed to imperial resolutions, Glissant wants to maintain the fundamental ambiguity of colonial identity, that doubled reality that is alive to more than one “here and now.” This is not merely an ethically or politically motivated alternative to universality, I want to suggest, but a metaphysically motivated one. It is an alternative model for conceptualizing subjectivity and knowledge that might make sense of the existence of many worlds as well as to make visible their interrelationality and connectedness. This surely has political advantages, but it also can make possible an advance in descriptive adequacy for pluritopic horizons.¶ Thus I would contest Mignolo’s claim that truth is out of the picture. And I would argue against the shift from epistemology to gnoseology (rather than redefining epistemology) if it is mainly motivated by a desire to dispense with truth. However, what is important here is not the word we use for the project so much as retaining the normative epistemic content to the project of critique and reconstruction that Mignolo and other postcolonialists want to pursue. If gnoseology can retain the critical and normative dimensions that aim to improve our understanding of truth, as well as the more inclusive aims in regard to forms of knowing, then I am on board.¶ I think there is a similar issue with regard to Mignolo’s treatment of identity and difference, and which relates to the question I raised earlier concerning the metaphysical status of the colonial difference. On the one hand, Mignolo resists the reification of difference and thus emphasizes how difference is constituted by coloniality. This could lead a reader to imagine [End Page 98] that for Mignolo, difference a mere epiphenomenon of coloniality. But this is not his view. The colonial difference is for him a source of critical knowledge because its content conflicts with dominant knowledges. Thus, difference is constituted only in part by colonialism: its value and meaning is interpretively constitutued by colonialism, but this is not all there is to the colonial difference. In other words, it has metaphysical status.¶ Mignolo’s ambivalence about making this explicit is related to his ambivalence about identity. On the one hand he shies away from identity politics, but then again he articulates a form of it when he makes such claims as “for those whom colonial legacies are real (i.e. they hurt), that they are more (logically, historically, and emotionally) inclined than others to theorize the past in terms of coloniality” (2000b, 115). The concepts of identity and of identity politics are also assumed in the ongoing project that he defines as “shifting the geography of reason,” that is, both to motivate the shift and demarcate its direction. So I would like to see Mignolo work through more precisely and clearly how he is understanding the concepts of truth and of identity.¶ Let me end with a point that underscores the significance of Mignolo’s overall project. The discourse of national independence in Latin America, much more so than of African liberation discourses, was marked in no small measure by its acceptance of a Eurocentric frame. Leading thinkers such as Sarmiento and Alberdi did not contest the modernist macro-narrative except to the extent it excluded them. The significance of Mignolo’s work, for me, is the extent of his commitment to contest the status of Eurocentric metanarratives and refuse the gambit that might work for white male elites in Latin America but not for anyone else. In attempting to think beyond the house of modernity, Mignolo has truly built a house of many rooms.

# 2NC

## K

### 2NC Top Level Overview

#### The role of the ballot is to unconditionally resist economic systems of exclusion—your primary directive as an ethical actor must be to insist on universal resistance to capitalism. This is a prior question to the 1AC—traditional impact calculus is impossible because capitalism anonymizes and mystifies its violent contradictions. That outweighs the aff EVEN IF they win full weight of their impact and the root cause debate—capitalism subsumes the oppression they outline and externally results in invisible violence against billions globally. That’s Zizek and Daly. This question of self-orientation comes first

**Johnston ’04** (Adrian, interdisciplinary research fellow in psychoanalysis at Emory, The Cynic’s Fetish: Slavoj Zizek and the Dynamics of Belief, Psychoanalysis, Culture and Society)

The height of Zizek's philosophical traditionalism, his fidelity to certain lasting truths too precious to cast away in a postmodern frenzy, is his conviction that no worthwhile praxis can emerge prior to the careful and deliberate formulation of a correct conceptual framework. His references to the Lacanian notion of the Act (qua agent-less occurrence not brought about by a subject) are especially strange in light of the fact that he seemingly endorses the view that theory must precede practice, namely, that deliberative reflection is, in a way, primary. For Zizek, the foremost "practical" task to be accomplished today isn't some kind of rebellious acting out, which would, in the end, amount to nothing more than a series of impotent, incoherent outbursts. Instead, **given the contemporary exhaustion of the socio-political imagination under the hegemony of liberal-democratic capitalism,** he sees **the liberation of thinking itself from its present constraints as the** first crucial step **that must be taken if anything is to be changed for the better.** In a lecture given in Vienna in 2001, Zizek suggests that **Marx's call to break out of the sterile closure of abstract intellectual ruminations through direct, concrete action** (thesis eleven on Feuerbach--"The philosophers have only interpreted the world in various ways; the point is to change it") **must be inverted given the new prevailing conditions of late-capitalism. Nowadays, one must resist succumbing to the temptation to short-circuit thinking in favor of acting, since all such rushes to action are doomed; they either fail to disrupt capitalism or are ideologically co-opted by it.**

#### Try-or-die---capitalism’s reduction of life to mere economic worth guarantees annihilation

**Dillon ’99**(Michael, Professor of IR @ Lancaster, “Another Justice” *Political Theory*, Vol. 27, No. 2. April, pp. 165)

Quite the reverse. The subject was never a firm foundation for justice, much less a hospitable vehicle for the reception of the call of another Justice. It was never in possession of that self-possession which was supposed to secure the certainty of itself, of a self-possession that would enable it ultimately to adjudicate everything. The very indexicality required of sovereign subjectivity gave rise rather to a commensurability much more amenable to the expendability required of the political and material economies of mass societies than it did to the singular, invaluable, and uncanny uniqueness of the self. **The value of the subject became the standard unit of currency for the political arithmetic of States and the political economies of capitalism.** They trade in it still to devastating global effect. The technologisation of the political has become manifest and global. **Economies of evaluation necessarily require calculability**.3s Thus no valuation without mensuration and no mensuration without indexation. **Once rendered calculable**, however, **units of account are necessarily submissible** not only to valuation but also, of course, **to devaluation. Devaluation, logically, can extend to the point of counting as nothing.** Hence, no mensuration without demensuration either. **There is nothing abstract about this: the declension of economies of value leads to the zero point of holocaust**. **However liberating and emancipating systems of value-rights-may claim to be, for example, they run the risk of counting out the invaluable. Counted out, the invaluable may then lose its purchase on life. Herewith, then, the necessity of championing the invaluable itself. For we must never forget that, "we are dealing always with whatever exceeds measure."**

#### Parr

economic meltdown; a frantic sell-off of public land to the energy business as President George W Bush exited the White House; a prolonged, costly, and unjustified war in Iraq; the Greek economy in ruins; an escalation of global food prices; bee colonies in global extinction; 925 million hungry reported in 2010; as of 2005, the world's five hundred richest individuals with a combined income greater than that of the poorest 416 million people, the richest 10 percent accounting for 54 percent of global income; a planet on the verge of boiling point; melting ice caps; increases in extreme weather conditions; and the list goes on and on and on.2 Sounds like a ticking time bomb, doesn't it? Well it is.

### \*\*2NC – EXT – Turns Modern Racism Distinction

#### Colonial slavery BECAME modern day wage slavery—only the alt has a chance of addressing 21st century exclusion

Jodi Melamed, Social Text 89, Vol. 24, No. 4, Winter 2006, The Spirit of Neoliberalism, DOI 10.1215/01642472-2006-009 © 2006 Duke University Press, online, jj

While we must continue to refute the old race thinking, we need an antiracism that can speak about how neoliberalism perpetuates racial capitalism, an antiracism that can politicize forms of biopolitical domination that move beyond conventional racial categories. Du Bois in his late work expanded the referential scope of abolitionism to show how racial slavery continued in wage slavery and to advocate for economic democracy (socialism, the “new abolitionism”) in the name of racial equality. Today, heterogeneous projects and voices assert the inseparability of the fight against racism and the fight against neoliberalism. The movement for prison abolition in the United States immediately stands out, particularly as theorized by Angela Davis, Joy James, and Ruth Gilmore.47 So does the vision Evo Morales articulates when he declares his election victory in Bolivia and state control over natural gas to be the beginning of the end of five hundred years of discrimination against indigenous people in the Americas and five hundred years of colonialism.48 Will the new race radicalism capture racial reference affirmatively enough to discredit neoliberalism’s appropriation of U.S. multiculturalism and to diminish its version of a just global order? These are open questions that the foregoing speculations invite.

#### Modern racism is detached from white supremacy proper—it’s predetermined by economic privilege

Jodi Melamed, Social Text 89, Vol. 24, No. 4, Winter 2006, The Spirit of Neoliberalism, DOI 10.1215/01642472-2006-009 © 2006 Duke University Press, online, jj

While liberal race procedures are unevenly detached from a wholesale white supremacist logic of race as phenotype, they remain deeply embedded in a logic of race as a set of what Nikhil Pal Singh describes as “historic repertoires and cultural, spatial and signifying systems that stigmatize and depreciate one form of humanity for the purposes of another’s health, development, safety, profit or pleasure.”3 Privileged and stigmatized racial formations no longer mesh perfectly with a color line. Instead, new categories of privilege and stigma determined by ideological, economic, and cultural criteria overlay older, conventional racial categories, so that traditionally recognized racial identities — black, Asian, white, or Arab/Muslim — can now occupy both sides of the privilege/stigma opposition. (For example, I will examine how an idea of “black pathology” distinguished stigmatized from privileged African American racial formations in the early Cold War and how the multicultural “Americanness” of Alberto Gonzalez or Condoleezza Rice currently stigmatizes undocumented Mexican immigrants and African American dissenters such as Julian Bond.) The new flexibility in racial procedures after World War II means that racism constantly appears as disappearing according to conventional race categories, even as it takes on new forms that can signify as nonracial or even antiracist.

### 2NC Link Overview

#### The 1AC implores you to “think and act from where we are”. This is antithetical to anti-capitalist resistance. Grounding politics in social location prevents comprehensive analysis of SOCIAL RELATIONS as a totality—causes a “snapshot” approach to understanding oppression that blocks class struggle

snapshot

Susan Ferguson ’08, is Assistant Professor in the Journalism Program at the Wilfrid Laurier University, Brantford Campus. Her previous work on feminist theory and politics explores the development of the social reproduction framework in the Canadian context. Current research interests include applying that framework to media and children's culture. Race, Gender & Class: Volume 15, Number 1-2, 2008 (42-57), CANADIAN CONTRIBUTIONS TO SOCIAL REPRODUCTION FEMINISM, RACE AND EMBODIED LABOR, <http://davidmcnally.org/wp-content/uploads/2011/01/Race-Gender-Class.pdf>, jj

Early attempts to develop a materialist, anti-racist feminism from a Marxian perspective foundered on the rocky shores of structuralism and economic reductionism—their end signaled in Heidi Hartmann’s 1979 critique, “The Unhappy Marriage of Marxism and Feminism.” Many years later, and only after a detour through a postmodern, Foucauldian landscape, progressive feminists have embraced a new comprehensive materialist approach, intersectionality. Insisting that any given social moment embodies a historically specific nexus of institutionalized relations of class, race, gender, etc., intersectionality overcomes many of the weaknesses associated with early Marxist feminism. Most importantly, it shifts the goal of analysis away from isolating and 2 ranking particular forms of oppression, and toward interrogating the manner in which they reinforce and/or contradict one another in and through people’s lived experiences. This has the decided merit of exploring subjectivities, of focusing analysis on people’s lives, not just abstract categories of race, gender and class. Yet, as Johanna Brenner argues, scholars who have adopted an intersectional perspective tend to limit their field of inquiry. They usually set out to describe and explain how specified social locations shape experience and identity, rather than to understand how such locations interact as part of a dynamic set of social relations. Such a snapshot approach doesn’t adequately probe the question of capitalism as a social power—the question, that is, of how processes, ideas and institutions associated with race, gender and class act upon each other to both reproduce and challenge the exclusions, inequality and exploitation characteristic of capitalist class societies. As a result, they often leave capitalist relations of social power, and resistance to that power under-theorized (Brenner, 2000:293).

#### Only the alt’s holistic focus on social relations rather than particular locations can create unified resistance

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When Brenner critiques intersectionality for its focus on social location as opposed to social relations, she is pointing out that many intersectional analyses fail to connect their descriptively rich accounts to that broader “unity.” Identifying nexuses of oppression and probing their inner workings has the advantage of “starting from experience,” and thus is a clear advance on structuralist political economy. But the most such analyses can do is highlight similarities and differences amongst discrete instances of oppression, and explain those oppressions in terms of contingent economic and cultural forces (state policies, policing practices, or the culture of whiteness, for example). To move beyond this, as Bannerji suggests, involves investigating how these experiences are socially mediated—that is, the way in which various social locations arise in a shared social space, a space shaped by certain colonial capitalist exigencies. A revised and expanded SRF framework conceptualizes those intersectional nexuses as products of labor—of creative activity undertaken to reproduce ourselves within this shared space. This, in turn, highlights not only the ways in which we partake in a broader set of social relations—relations that, because of the alienated form of much of our labor, often end up dominating us—but also the embodied nature of that activity, the biophysical differentiation and spatial location of the laboring body that, under conditions of capitalist reproduction, inscribe that body with both gender and race. As a result, real and systemic connections between the endlessly varied struggles of the oppressed become apparent, between, for instance, a childcare worker strike in Vancouver, the struggle to protect schooling for girls in Kabul and the environmental movement against mega-dams along India’s River Narmada.

#### Focus on standpoint epistemology negates analysis of material conditions—it’s neoliberal identity politics par excellance—undermines solidarity of the proletariat

Varn & Curcio ’13, C. DERICK VARN, Jasmine Curcio is a scholar and feminist activist in Melbourne, Australia., 4-16-’13, The North Star, Materialism and Patriarchy: An Interview with Jasmine Curcio, <http://www.thenorthstar.info/?p=8502>, jj

Standpoint epistemology in its idealist, identity-politic formation is often used to negate any materialist analysis and sound standpoint epistemology based in materialist analysis of systems which in part intersect, but that latter meaning of intersection is not the essence of “intersectionality.” Intersectionality is concerned with the intersection of varied identities, atomized and particular, from supposedly immediate experience, with no real or primary understanding of consciousness and thus identity being formed by systems, as it has eschewed such an understanding. It becomes, in intersection with liberal privilege discourse, part of the ideological repertoire of neoliberal identity politics. And the understanding, if not the assumption, that oppression lives in individual behaviors, hence the isolate concepts of “privilege” divorced from any real understanding of what a system of oppression entails (it is not the mere sum of “privileges”), but described with respect to individual actions and perceptions in the first person. Such things are useful as an educational guide pointing beyond itself to something larger, but that is often not the case.

C.D.V.: I have heard standpoint epistemology linked to a Marxian analysis of social awareness. Why do you think standpoint epistemology tends towards idealism?

J.C.: I do not think it is all standpoint epistemology which is idealist; rather for any standpoint epistemology to truly make sense it must be anchored in the material. Let’s take a classic example, Georg Lukács in History and Class Consciousness. He defines class consciousness as “consist[ing] in fact of the appropriate and rational reactions ‘imputed’ to a particular typical position in the process of production.” So already we have a material situation from which class consciousness, whether false or true, can be examined, with respect to any economic class and its activity in history. So, the proletariat, due to its unique position, has the potential to view the social totality of capitalism and have the power to demolish capitalism.

Let’s take this to feminism. Women, due to their position in the patriarchal system and undergoing objectification and appropriation, have the unique potential to view patriarchal society, and can often see the operations of the masculine gender construct better than most men can in their state of false consciousness, and the same with people of color in a racist system. But I do want to address the idealist tendency here.

There appears to be a sort of liberal appropriation of this materialist standpoint epistemology and divesting it of its concretion. Without an understanding of a materialist system, of course, what one is left with is pure subjective consciousness, but no notion of a system of oppression, of social forces shaping individuals. It is just a pure abstract standpoint that can be taken by almost any subject, whose legitimacy is granted by its mere subjectivity and the appearance of the phenomena they describe. This has been taken in recent years by liberal activists, such as pro-sex-work, self-defined “sex workers.” And their perspective has some presumed sovereignty, and is entirely unrelated to a comprehensive systemic understanding of patriarchy, because to admit of such a thing and its effect would nullify the preciously constructed identity of the “empowered sex worker,” as the knowledge of one’s construction and mediation by patriarchal social forces would certainly ruin the high sustained on male attention and praise. To inform them of De Beauvoir’s distinction between prostitutes and hetairas (usually high-class, women who consider their entire selves capital to be exploited, and experience a curious narcissism in their false consciousness of their state of dependency), produces a great deal of anger in the undermining of their identity.

So basically, standpoint epistemology can only be made to make sense within the understanding of a material system of oppression. When divorced from that, it is as abstractly idealist as one can imagine. Indeed, it is an integral part of liberal identity politics which eschews any systemic understanding, substituting it with one-dimensional perceptions that cannot integrate into a comprehensive social totality but clash with other identities, which can at best intersect with each other. Truth becomes something enclosed within individuals who view themselves as a socially-impermeable identity category, which undermines real solidarity and connection with others, as the logic of identity politics is atomizing.

#### The aff’s post-colonial epistemology reduces fundamentally economic antagonisms to questions of “otherness”---this results in endless narration of victimization that cements capitalism

Slavoj Zizek, Critical Inquiry¶ Winter 2002¶ A Plea for Leninist Intolerance <http://www.lacan.com/zizek-plea.htm>

One is therefore tempted to turn around Marx's eleventh thesis: the first task today is precisely not to succumb to the temptation to act, to directly intervene and change things (which then inevitably ends in a cul de sac of debilitating impossibility, leaving one to ask, What can one do against global capital?) but to question the hegemonic ideological coordinates. If, today, one follows a direct call to act, this act will not be performed in an empty space; it will be an act within the hegemonic ideological coordinates: those who "really want to do something to help people" get involved in (undoubtedly honorable) exploits like Doctors without Borders, Greenpeace, feminist and antiracist campaigns, which are all not only tolerated but even supported by the media, even if they seemingly enter economic territory (say, denouncing and boycotting companies that do not respect ecological conditions or that use child labor). They are tolerated and supported as long as they do not get too close to a certain limit. Let us take two predominant topics from today's American radical academia, postcolonial and queer studies. The problem of postcolonialism is undoubtedly crucial; however, postcolonial studies tends to translate it into the multiculturalist problematic of the colonized minorities' right to narrate their victimizing experience, of the power mechanisms that repress otherness, so that, at the end of the day, we learn that the root of postcolonial exploitation is our intolerance toward the Other and, furthermore, that this intolerance itself is rooted in our intolerance toward the "Stranger in Ourselves," in our inability to confront what we repressed in and of ourselves. Thus the politico-economic struggle is thus imperceptibly transformed into a pseudo-psychoanalytic drama of the subject unable to confront its inner traumas. The true corruption of American academia is not primarily financial, it is not only that they are able to buy many European critical intellectuals (myself included, up to a point), but conceptual: notions of European critical theory are imperceptibly translated into the benign universe of cultural studies chic. With regard to this radical chic, the first gesture toward Third Way ideologists and practitioners should be that of praise; they, at least, play their game in a straight way and are honest in their acceptance of global capitalist coordinates in contrast to the pseudoradical academic leftists who adopt the attitude of utter disdain toward the Third Way, while their own radicality ultimately amounts to an empty gesture that obliges no one to anything determinate.

#### Epist focus --- focus on epistemology tricks us into thinking that changing worldviews or mindsets is enough—lets us off the hook for altering material relations proper. Their Mignolo evidence assumes “epistemic de-linking” will wish away colonialism—that’s a smokescreen and links to our offense

**Taft-Kaufman 95** (Jill, Speech prof @ CMU, Southern Comm. Journal, Spring, v. 60, Iss. 3, “Other Ways”)

**The postmodern passwords of "polyvocality," "Otherness," and "difference," unsupported by substantial analysis of the concrete contexts of subjects, creates a solipsistic quagmire**. The political sympathies of the new cultural critics, with their ostensible concern for the lack of power experienced by marginalized people, aligns them with the political left. Yet, **despite their adversarial posture and talk of opposition, their discourses on intertextuality and inter-referentiality isolate them from and ignore the conditions that have produced leftist politics--conflict, racism, poverty, and injustice**. In short, as Clarke (1991) asserts, postmodern emphasis on new subjects conceals the old subjects, those who have limited access to good jobs, food, housing, health care, and transportation, as well as to the media that depict them. Merod (1987) decries **this** situation as one which **leaves no vision, will, or commitment to activism**. He notes that academic lip service to the oppositional is underscored by the absence of focused collective or politically active intellectual communities. Provoked by the academic manifestations of this problem Di Leonardo (1990) echoes Merod and laments: Has there ever been a historical era characterized by as little radical analysis or activism and as much radical-chic writing as ours? **Maundering on about Otherness:** phallocentrism or Eurocentric tropes **has become a lazy academic substitute for actual engagement with the detailed histories and contemporary realities** of Western racial minorities, white women, or any Third World population. (p. 530) Clarke's assessment of the **postmodern elevation of language to the "sine qua non"** of critical discussion **is an even stronger indictment against the trend.** Clarke examines Lyotard's (1984) The Postmodern Condition in which Lyotard maintains that virtually all social relations are linguistic, and, therefore, it is through the coercion that threatens speech that we enter the "realm of terror" and society falls apart. To this assertion, Clarke replies**:**  I can think of few more striking indicators of the political and intellectual impoverishment of a view of society that can only recognize the discursive. **If the worst terror we can envisage is the threat not to be allowed to speak, we are appallingly ignorant of terror in its elaborate contemporary forms. It may be the intellectual's conception of terror** (what else do we do but speak?), **but its projection onto the rest of the world would be calamitous....(**pp. 2-27) **The** realm of the **discursive is derived from the requisites for human life,** which are in the physical world**, rather than in a world of ideas or symbols**.(4) Nutrition, shelter, and protection are basic human needs that require collective activity for their fulfillment. **Postmodern emphasis on the discursive without an accompanying analysis of how the discursive emerges from material circumstances hides the complex task of envisioning and working towards concrete social goals** (Merod, 1987). Although the material conditions that create the situation of marginality escape the purview of the postmodernist, the situation and its consequences are not overlooked by scholars from marginalized groups. Robinson (1990) for example, argues that "**the justice that working people deserve is economic, not just textual"** (p. 571). Lopez (1992) states that "**the starting point for organizing the program content of education or political action must be the** present existential, **concrete situation"** (p. 299). West (1988) asserts that borrowing French post-structuralist discourses about "Otherness" blinds us to realities of American difference going on in front of us (p. 170). Unlike postmodern "textual radicals" who Rabinow (1986) acknowledges are "fuzzy about power and the realities of socioeconomic constraints" (p. 255), most writers from marginalized groups are clear about how discourse interweaves with the concrete circumstances that create lived experience. **People whose lives form the material for postmodern counter-hegemonic discourse do not share the optimism over the new recognition of their discursive subjectivities, because such an acknowledgment does not address sufficiently their collective historical and current struggles against racism, sexism, homophobia, and economic injustice.** They do not appreciate being told they are living in a world in which there are no more real subjects. **Ideas have consequences. Emphasizing the discursive self when a person is hungry and homeless represents both a cultural and humane failure. The need to look beyond texts to the perception and attainment of concrete social goals keeps writers from marginalized groups ever-mindful of the specifics of how power works through political agendas,** institutions, agencies, and the budgets that fuel them.

#### We should not perform epistemic delinking but rather assert the possibility of Universal Truth. The alt is not a view from nowhere but rather an attempt to locate truth as the Singular Universal—it’s the 3rd way between neutral objective knowledge and the aff’s vacuous particular relativism

Zizek, 8 [Dr. Slavoj Zizek, (Institute for Social Sciences, Ljubljana, Slovenia), Volume 5, Number 1 (January, 2008). The Prospects of Radical Politics Today, <http://www.ubishops.ca/baudrillardstudies/vol5_1/v5-1-article3-zizek.html>, jj]

This, then, is what gets lost in Singer's geistige Tierreich: the Thing, something to which we are unconditionally attached irrespective of its positive qualities. In Singer's universe, there is a place for mad cows, but no place for an Indian sacred cow. In other words, what gets lost here is simply the dimen­sion of truth – not "objective truth" as the notion of reality from a point of view which somehow floats above the multitude of particular narratives, but truth as the Singular Universal. When Lenin says "The theory of Marx is all ­powerful, because it is true," everything depends on how we understand "truth" here: is it a neutral "objective knowledge," or the truth of an engaged subject? Lenin's wager – today, in our era of postmodern relativism, more actual than ever – is that universal truth and partisanship, the gesture of tak­ing sides, are not only not mutually exclusive, but condition each other: in a concrete situation, its universal truth can only be articulated from a thor­oughly partisan position – truth is by definition one-sided. This, of course, goes against the predominant doxa of compromise, of finding a middle path among the multitude of conflicting interests. If one does not specify the crite­ria of the different, alternate narrativization, then this endeavor courts the danger of endorsing, in the Politically Correct mood, ridiculous "narratives" like those about the supremacy of some aboriginal holistic wisdom, of dis­missing science as just another narrative on a par with premodern supersti­tions.

### Zizek ID K Bad

#### Universalism has and must be redeployed in non-Eurocentric contexts --- their insistence on epistemological inclusivity turns all their offense

Zizek ‘02

Žižek, Senior Researcher at the Institute for Social Science (University of Ljubljana), 2002 [Slavoj, inteview with Bad Subjects, “I am a Fighting Atheist: Interview with Slavoj Žižek,” Bad Subjects, Issue #59, February, <http://eserver.org/bs/59/zizek.html>]

BS: Several times you've used the word "universalism." For trafficking in such concepts, people you'd identify as forces of political correctness have indicted you for Eurocentrism. You've even written a radical leftist plea for Eurocentrism. How do you respond to the PC camp's charges against you? Zizek: I think that we should accept that universalism is a Eurocentrist notion. This may sound racist, but I don't think it is. Even when Third World countries appeal to freedom and democracy, when they formulate their struggle against European imperialism, they are at a more radical level endorsing the European premise of universalism. You may remember that in the struggle against apartheid in South Africa, the ANC always appealed to universal Enlightenment values, and it was Buthelezi, the regime's black supporter in the pay of the CIA, who appealed to special African values. My opponent here is the widely accepted position that we should leave behind the quest for universal truth — that what we have instead are just different narratives about who we are, the stories we tell about ourselves. So, in that view, the highest ethical injunction is to respect the other story. All the stories should be told, each ethnic, political, or sexual group should be given the right to tell its story, as if this kind of tolerance towards the plurality of stories with no universal truth value is the ultimate ethical horizon. I oppose this radically. This ethics of storytelling is usually accompanied by a right to narrate, as if the highest act you can do today is to narrate your own story, as if only a black lesbian mother can know what it's like to be a black lesbian mother, and so on. Now this may sound very emancipatory. But the moment we accept this logic, we enter a kind of apartheid. In a situation of social domination, all narratives are not the same. For example, in Germany in the 1930s, the narrative of the Jews wasn't just one among many. This was the narrative that explained the truth about the entire situation. Or today, take the gay struggle. It's not enough for gays to say, "we want our story to be heard." No, the gay narrative must contain a universal dimension, in the sense that their implicit claim must be that what happens to us is not something that concerns only us. What is happening to us is a symptom or signal that tells us something about what's wrong with the entirety of society today. We have to insist on this universal dimension.

#### Latin American revolutionary movements prove.

Riddell, 09, (John, editor of a number of books publishing the key documents and resolutions of the international revolutionary socialist movement from 1907 to 1923. Six volumes have been published to date, by Pathfinder Press, under the title [The Communist International in Lenin’s Time](http://readingfromtheleft.com/Books/CI/LeninsTime.html). <http://kasamaproject.org/theory/1823-55is-marxism-eurocentric-a-view-from-latin-america>)

In Kohan's opinion, the Cuban revolution's leading role continued in the 1970s, when it "revived the revolutionary Marxism of the 1920s (simultaneously anti-imperialist and anti-capitalist) as well as Marx's more unfamiliar works -- above all his later works that study colonialism and peripheral and dependent societies. In these writings Marx overcomes the Eurocentric views of his youth."12¶ Kohan identifies the insights of the "Late Marx" as follows:¶ History does not follow an unvarying evolutionary path.¶ Western Europe does not constitute a single evolutionary centre through which stages of historical development are radiated outwards to the rest of the world.¶ "Subjugated peoples do not experience 'progress' so long as they remain under the boot of imperialism."13¶ Latin American thought here rests on the mature Marx's views on capitalism's impact on colonial societies, such as Ireland. It also intersects with Marx's late writings and research known to us primarily through Teodor Shanin's Late Marx and the Russian Road.14 Shanin's book can now be usefully reread as a commentary on today's Latin American struggles.¶ ¶ Marx devoted much of his last decade to study of Russia and of Indigenous societies in North America. His limited writings on these questions focused on the Russian peasant commune, the mir, which then constituted the social foundation of agriculture in that country.

#### Marx is the origin of anti-colonialist thought.

Hampton, 12 (Paul, Alliance for Workers Liberty, January 28, http://www.workersliberty.org/blogs/paulhampton/2012/01/26/marxism-eurocentric)

Marx wrote hundreds of articles for the New York Daily Tribune newspaper in the 1850s and it is here that his first writings on the wider world beyond Europe are found. Much of his early research (which would continue to the end of his life) concerned India. Marx wrote in 1853 that Britain’s colonisation of India had fulfilled a double mission: “the annihilation of old Asiatic society and the laying the material foundations of Western society in Asia” (The Future Results of British Rule in India, 22 July 1853). But far from justifying colonialism, Marx actually provided the basis for resisting it. He wrote that “the misery inflicted by the British on Hindostan is of an essentially different and infinitely more intensive kind than all Hindostan had to suffer before” and that British rule in India unveiled the “profound hypocrisy and inherent barbarism of bourgeois civilisation”. ¶ Beyond denouncing British imperialism, Marx also pointed out that “a fresh class is springing up, endowed with the requirements for government”. He looked forward to the time when “the Hindoos themselves shall have grown strong enough to throw off the English yoke altogether”. In Investigation of Tortures in India (17 September 1857), Marx asked readers to consider “whether a people are not justified in attempting to expel the foreign conquerors who have so abused their subjects”. In the late 1850s, Marx supported the Sepoy Uprising in India as well as Chinese resistance to the British during the Second Opium War. ¶ Marx’s 1853 writings on India constitute the first instance of a major European thinker supporting India’s independence. This has been acknowledged by Indian historian Ifran Habib, who argued: “In 1853 to set colonial emancipation, not just colonial reform, as an objective of the European socialist movement; and still more, to look forward to a national liberation movement (‘throwing off the English yoke’) attained through their struggle by the Indian people, as an event that might even precede the emancipation of the European working class – such an insight and vision could belong to Marx alone” (Anderson 2010 p.23).

#### Marxism historically was aligned with anti-racist movements

Hampton, 12 (Paul, Alliance for Workers Liberty, January 28, http://www.workersliberty.org/blogs/paulhampton/2012/01/26/marxism-eurocentric)

Marx was also politically clear and explicit about the greatest anti-racist cause of his day, namely the abolition of slavery in the United States. Marx was public and vocal in his support for the anti-slavery dynamic of the US civil war, lauding the support given by British cotton workers to the North (despite personal hardship) and demanding that the North make “the emancipation of the slaves” its motto. Marx did not ignore the issue of racism in Capital, when he wrote that “Labor cannot emancipate itself in the white skin where in the black it is branded.” ¶ Anderson also discusses Marx’s attitude toward national oppression, highlighting the evolution of his views on Poland and Ireland. Marx and Engels both spoke at the London meeting in November 1847 to mark the seventeenth anniversary of the Polish uprising, where Engels stated that “a nation cannot become free and at the same time continue to oppress other nations”. Marx wrote to Engels (2 December 1856) that the attitude towards Polish independence was the “‘external’ thermometer” of the credentials of revolutionaries. Anderson draws out particularly well Marx’s support for Chechen rebels against Russia, which was visible in over a dozen articles written during the Crimean war (2010 p.51). ¶ Marx used his inaugural address to the International Working Men’s Association, to draw attention to the national oppression of Poland and the Chechen. Their treatment had “taught the working classes the duty to master themselves the mysteries of international politics; to watch the diplomatic acts of their respective governments; to counteract them, if necessary, by all means in their power; when unable to prevent, to combine in simultaneous denunciations, and to vindicate the simple laws or morals and justice, which ought to govern the relations of private individuals, as the rules paramount of the intercourse of nations. The fight for such a foreign policy forms part of the general struggle for the emancipation of the working classes” (27 October 1864). The London Conference of the First International (25-29 September 1865) passed a resolution which stated: “That it is imperative to annihilate the invading influence of Russia in Europe by applying to Poland ‘the right of every people to dispose of itself’ and re-establishing that country on a social and democratic basis” (Cummins 1980 p.94). ¶ Anderson does not discuss Engels’ conception of “non-historic peoples” in great detail, since his focus is on Marx (It was also dealt with exhaustively by Rosdolsky). However it is clear from the book that dividing peoples into “historic” and “non-historic” is no part of the Marxist approach to national questions. Anderson is also forthright about Marx’s “extremely problematic comments on Jews in his published work”. He states: “None, not even Marx’s strongest defenders on this issue, however, have suggested that Marx made a significant positive contribution on the issue of Jews and anti-Semitism” (2010 p.52). Later Marxists, including Engels, Bebel, Kautsky and Trotsky did however develop more coherent Marxist interpretations. ¶ Marx’s most developed treatment of the national question was his stance on Ireland. Cummins criticised the early Engels for holding to “an Anglocentric approach to the liberation of Ireland” (1980 p.108). Yet it was Engels who highlighted the plight of Irish migrant workers in The Condition of the Working-Class in England (1845) and who played a major role in informing Marx of the realities of Ireland. He wrote to Marx that “Ireland may be regarded as the earliest English colony and one which, by reason of proximity, is still governed in exactly the same old way; here one cannot fail to notice that the English citizen’s so-called freedom is based on the oppression of the colonies” (23 May 1856). Engels also wrote that “Irish history shows what a misfortune it is for one nation to subjugate another. All English abominations have their origin in the Irish pale” (24 October 1869). ¶ After nearly 25 years as a revolutionary, Marx came out for Irish independence. He wrote to Engels: “I once believed the separation of Ireland from England to be impossible. I now regard it as inevitable, although federation may follow upon separation” (2 November 1867). In his Speech on the Irish Question, Marx wrote that “The English should demand separation and leave it to the Irish themselves to decide the question of landownership. Everything else would be useless” (16 December 1867).¶ Marx emphasised Irish oppression and the benefits of separation for English workers. He wrote to Kugelmann: “I have become more and more convinced — and the thing now is to drum this conviction into the English working class — that they will never be able to do anything decisive here in England before they separate their attitude towards Ireland quite definitely from that of the ruling classes, and not only make common cause with the Irish, but even take the initiative in dissolving the Union established in 1801, and substituting a free federal relationship for it”. He argued that “this must be done not out of sympathy for Ireland, but as a demand based on the interests of the English proletariat”, otherwise “the English people will remain bound to the leading-strings of the ruling classes”. For Marx, “every movement of the working class in England itself is crippled by the dissension with the Irish, who form a very important section of the working class in England itself”. However in Ireland itself, “once affairs have been laid in the hands of the Irish people themselves, as soon as they have made themselves their own legislators and rulers, as soon as they have become autonomous, it will be infinitely easier there than here to abolish the landed aristocracy” (29 November 1869). ¶ On the one hand, England was “the metropolis of capital”, the dominant power on the world market and “the only country in which the material conditions for this revolution have reached a certain degree of maturity”. Marx argued that the sole means of hastening the social revolution was to make Ireland independent. The task of the International was “to make the English workers realise that for them the national emancipation of Ireland is not a question of abstract justice or humanitarian sentiment but the first condition of their own social emancipation” (Letter to Meyer and Vogt, 9 April 1870).¶ Anderson does not discuss the gaps and omissions in Marx’s understanding of Ireland. Nor does he analyse the limitations of Marx’s view of the national question. However he quotes a comment by Erica Benner that, “It would be wrong to infer that his support for Irish independence brought him [Marx] closer to endorsing a supra-historical principle of national self-determination” (Anderson 2010 p.151). This seems to miss the point. The essence of self-determination is the subjective sense that peoples themselves determine their identity (“dispose of itself”) and form of self-government (“affairs in their own hands”). Marx and Engels did not start by applying this principle to every people, but by the end of their lives there they had substantially widened its application, including to the non-European world. There are sufficient grounds to suggest their view is consistent with later Marxists who explicitly supported the “right” to national self-determination. What Marx rightly avoided was to assume that the right to self-determination automatically meant “advocating independence” in every case. The solution proffered depended on the impact on the working class and on international relations. ¶ One of the most important arguments Anderson makes is that Marx’s views on race, nationality and non-European societies developed over his lifetime and that the mature Marx had a more sophisticated assessment in his political economy and later studies. He decisively rejects the view, which was promulgated by the Stalinists, of a unilinear succession of stage in history, with capitalism preceded only by “feudalism”. It is clear from Marx’s political economy, particularly the first draft (the Grundrisse) and second draft (1861-63 manuscripts) of what he called the Asiatic mode of production that pre-capitalist economic societies took a variety of forms. Recent Marxist writing on the “tributary mode of production” has advanced the multilinearity of class societies in history. ¶ Anderson successfully nails one of the great myths against Marxism, namely that it assumes all societies will follow the same path through capitalism. In the preface to the first German edition of Capital volume 1, Marx is usually translated as believing that “the country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future”. However the later French edition can be translated slightly differently as “the country that is more developed industrially only shows to those that follow it on the industrial path, the image of its own future”. Anderson believes that the altered text made clear, as far as Marx was concerned, that “his narrative of primitive accumulation was meant as a description of Western European development, nothing more, and hardly a global grand narrative” (2010 p.179). ¶ A further notable contribution is Anderson’s discussion of Marx’s last studies. In 1879-82, Marx made excerpt notebooks on non-Western and precapitalist societies, which extend to over 300,000 words. They were not published even in the heyday of the Bolsheviks: Riazanov characterised them as examples of “inexcusable pedantry”. Some of the material was published by Lawrence Krader in The Ethnological Notebooks of Karl Marx (1972). Krader pointed to the possibility that these notebooks were concerned “not so much with the origins of social hierarchy in the distant past, as with the social relations within contemporary societies under the impact of capitalist globalisation” (2010 p.201). ¶ In these last writings, Marx was not simply carrying over concepts of social structure drawn from the Western European model into Asian social relations. Marx wrote to editors of Otechestvennye Zapiski that “by studying each of these evolutions separately, and then comparing them, one will easily find the key to these phenomena, but one will never succeed with the master-key of a historico-philosophical theory whose supreme virtue consists in being supra-historical” (November 1877). The Marxist method meant starting from the “specific economic form in which surplus labour was pumped out of the direct producers”. This conception of exploitation and from it a distinctive conception of class relations, allowed for wide variation in societies and states, not only in the past but in the modern world. This insight is absolutely central to understanding the evolution of capitalism (and indeed of Stalinist societies) since Marx’s death. ¶ Anderson’s book is a valuable addition to Marxist literature. He is right that Marx “kept searching for new allies for the Western working class in its struggle against capital”. Marx was a theorist who “took account of nationalism and ethnicity as well as class”. In his mature works, Marx was not occupied solely with the capital relation and the class struggle, to the exclusion of nationalism, race and ethnicity (2010 p.238-39). Much underlabouring is still needed to integrate these vectors into a coherent Marxist view of current reality. The insights which Anderson extracts from Marx’s work will help us with that task.¶

### A2: Double Turn

#### Contradictory positions crucial to solve AUTHORITARIAN pedagogy and lead to critical thinking - outweighs because only education spills over

Lewis and Dehler 00

Journal of Management Education December 2000 vol. 24 no. 6 708-725

U Cincinnati College of Business, Professor Lewis is the Interim Associate Dean of Undergraduate Programs and Professor of Management. She also leads the Kolodzik Business Scholars Program, as its themes of innovation, collaboration and globalization are closely linked to her research and teaching interests. Indeed, her work addresses paradoxes that impede and enable innovation. In particular, Dr. Lewis explores the need to manage paradoxes in three domains.

Gordon E. Dehler, PhD. Associate Professor. The College of Charleston. School of Business and Economics. Department of Management & Entrepreneurship

Teaching with paradox requires “walking the talk.” If students are truly going to be inspired to think outside the box, we need not only to help them critique the box of oversimplified, polarized frames but also to model paradoxical thinking ourselves. As Farson (1996) noted, paradoxical thinking taps the power of uncertainty and ambiguity: “Absurdly, our most important human affairs—marriage, education, leadership—do best when there is an occasional loss of control and an increase in personal vulnerability, times when we do not know what to do” (p. 38). Recalling our earlier discussion of the control/flexibility paradox, the paradox of teaching with paradox lies in the need to provide order and foster creative tension. In this regard, we have found that teaching with paradox offers a valuable learning opportunity for instructors as well as students. By being self-reflective ourselves, we have become highly conscientious of our own defenses—our desire to control the classroom—and the paradoxical need to allow, even cultivate, an element of confusion to enable more insightful experiences. This requires resisting the temptation to overuse teaching paradigm tactics, that is, refraining from merely telling students about paradoxes and regulating their experiences and instead constructing boundaries within which they may comfortably question inadequacies of their understandings. Such needs complement and extend those of other learning paradigm strategies. For instance, Mallinger (1998) recently wrote of the need to give up control, to maintain control when using collaborative learning approaches, whereas Dennehy, Sims, and Collins (1998) examined the conflicting needs of experiential learning. Ambiguity is necessary so that individuals are personally stretched to apply concepts to real situations. It may seem paradoxical that the pursuit of a conceptual model for debriefing is urged, yet ambiguity is also urged, to meet the subjective needs of individuals. Both requirements (structure and ambiguity), however, can be met if the management educator is cognizant of . . . the debriefing model and uses it as a road map to facilitate discussion so that all learning states are experienced. (p. 18) Barrett’s (1998) seven injunctions of the “Paradox Mind-Set” remind instructors to be purposeful, open, skeptical, contrary, paralogical, imaginative, and courageous, as they encourage students to do likewise. Modeling paradoxical thinking entails remaining focused on the process and objectives of intentional learning while displaying curiosity, honesty, and selfreflection. By provoking insightful debate, conflict can become a source of creativity, and playing devil’s advocate may help students identify their underlying assumptions and more complicated questions to move beyond which alternative is “right” (Dehler &Welsh, 1993). Critiquing oversimplified explanations and taken-for-granted, often nonsensical, conventions, students can be inspired to seek and accommodate opposing views, to creatively make sense of contradictions by transcending either/or logic and overcoming fears of sounding absurd. Finally, the potential value of students’ leaving the classroom with some confusion or dissatisfaction should not be overlooked as a constructive tactic. Palmer (1998) proposed that “good education is always more process than product . . . [and] may leave students deeply dissatisfied, at least for a while” (p. 94). Likewise, French (1997) explained that teachers may use anxiety to foster creative tension and energy while avoiding an excess that freezes students within their defenses. Using the learning space provided by paradox requires staying with the uncertainty long enough to explore contradictions rather than suppress them, examining the ambivalence of mixed feelings, conflicting demands, and uncertainty. Rather than providing oversimplified closure to a complicated discussion, leaving a class with unresolved questions may spur further exploration to reduce confusion and complexity. A degree of unresolved tension or “dissatisfaction may be a sign that real education has happened” (Palmer, 1998, p. 94).

### A2 devalue epistemologies

#### This idea, is the central axiom of debate: that we are all capable of political speech and action. This must become our axiom, our starting point: that there is no one a priori incapable of engaging politically. The presentation of this idea is both predictable and surprising, but the ballot’s commitment to it breaks from the comparison of privilege that you are otherwise forced to engage in and allows the judge to pragmatically move both debate and politics in an entirely new direction in history

Vote negative for a politics of the radical break – this round is crucial because we must constantly focus on the way we situate our politics within history

Badiou 10 (Alain, Prof. @ European Graduate School, Former chair of Philosophy @ École Normale Supérieure, *The Idea of Communism*, pgs. 11-13)

We will now ask: why is it necessary to resort to this ambiguous opera­tion? Why do the event and its consequences also have to be exposed in the guise of a fact — often a violent one — that is accompanied by different versions of the cult of personality'? What is the reason for this historical appropriation of emancipatory politics? The simplest reason is that ordinary history, the history of individ­ual lives, is confined within the State. The history of a life, with neither decision nor choice, is in itself a part of the history of the State, whose conventional mediations are the family, work, the homeland, property, religion, customs, and so forth. The heroic, but individual, projection of an exception to all the above - as is a truth procedure - also aims at being shared with everyone else; it aims to show itself to be not only an excep­tion but also a possibility that everyone can share from now on. And that is one of the Idea's functions: to project the exception into the ordinary life of individuals, to fill what merely exists with a certain measure of the extraordinary. To convince my own immediate circle — husband or wife, neighbours and friends, colleagues — that the fantastic exception of truths in the making also exists, that we are not doomed to lives programmed by the constraints of the State. Naturally, in the final analysis, only the raw, or militant, experience of the truth procedure will compel one or another person's entry into the body of truth. But to take him or her to the place where this experience is to be found – to make him or her a spectator of, and therefore partly a participant in, what is important for a truth — the mediation of the Idea, the sharing of the Idea, are almost always required. The Idea of communism (regardless of what name it might otherwise be given, which hardly matters: no Idea is definable by its name) is what enables a truth procedure to be spoken in the impure language of the State, and thereby for the lines of force by virtue of which the State prescribes what is possible and what is impossible to be shifted for a time. In this view of things, the most ordinary action is to take someone to a real politi­cal meeting, far from their home, far from their predetermined existential parameters, in a hostel of workers from Mali, for example, or at the gates of a factory. Once they have come to the place where politics is occurring, they will make a decision about whether to incorporate or withdraw. But in order for them to come to that place, the Idea — and for two centuries, or perhaps since Plato, it has been the Idea of communism — must have already shifted them in the order of representations, of History and of the State. The symbol must imaginarily come to the aid of the creative flight from the Real. Allegorical facts must ideologize and historicize the fragility of truth. A banal yet crucial discussion among four workers and a student in an ill-lit room must momentarily be enlarged to the dimensions of Communism and thus be both what it is and what it will have been as a moment in the local construction of the True. Through the enlargement of the symbol, it must become visible that just ideas' come from this prac­tically invisible practice. The five-person meeting in an out-of-the-way suburb must be eternal in the very expression of its precariousness. That is why the real must be exposed in a fictional structure. The second reason is that every event is a surprise. If this were not the case, it would mean that it would have been predictable as a fact, and so would be inscribed in the history of the State, which is a contradiction in terms. The problem can thus be formulated in the following way: how can we prepare ourselves for such surprises? And this time the problem really exists, even if we are already currently militants of a previous event's consequences, even if we are included in a body-of-truth. Granted, we are proposing the deployment of new possibilities. However, the event to come will turn what is still impossible, even for us, into a possibility. In order to anticipate, at least ideologically or intellectually, the creation of new possibilities, we must have an Idea. An Idea that of course involves the newness of the possibilities that the truth procedure of which we are the militants has brought to light, which are real-possibilities, but an Idea that also involves the formal possibility of other possibilities, ones as yet unsuspected by us. An Idea is always the assertion that a new truth is historically possible. And since the forcing of the impossible into the possi­ble occurs via subtraction from the power of the State, an Idea can be said to assert that this subtractive process is infinite. It is always formally possible that the dividing line drawn by the State between the possible and the impossible may once again be shifted, however radical its previous shifts — including the one in which we as militants are currently taking part - may have been. That is why one of the contents of the communist Idea today - as opposed to the theme of communism as a goal to be attained through the work of a new State - is that the withering away of the State, while undoubtedly a principle that must be apparent in any political action (which is expressed by the formula 'politics at a distance from the State' as an obligatory refusal of any direct inclusion in the State, of any request for funding from the State, of any participation in elections, etc.), is also an infinite task, since the creation of new political truths will always shift the dividing line between Statist, hence historical, facts and the eternal consequences of an event.

### A2: Particularity Good/Universal fails

#### They cannot win uniqueness – Capital will constantly annihilate the particular

Dean, Associate Professor of Political Theory at Hobart & William Smith, 2005

Jodi, Zizek against Democracy, jdeanicite.typepad.com/i\_cite/files/zizek\_against\_ democracy\_new\_version.doc –

To summarize: Zizek argues that the democratic form runs up against a stain or non-universalizable kernel. Using Lacan, he understands this kernel as a stain of enjoyment, of an irreducible attachment to an intense pleasure-pain. The empty place of democracy is never fully empty. It comes up against points of non-universalizability—founding violence, ethnic particularity, the national Thing. Indeed, insofar as democracy has been a project of the Nation, its very starting point, its position of enunciation, requires this non-universalizable kernel. To the extent that liberal democracy tries to eliminate this stain, tries to exclude ethic fundamentalism and nationalist attachment, it necessarily fails. And, under conditions of late capitalism, the problem is even worse. Like liberal democracy, Capital wants to eliminate particular attachments. Liberal-democratic attacks on ethnic fundamentalism, then, serve capitalist ends at they attack some of the few remaining sites of opposition to capitalism. Nationalist, ethnic, racist violence thus persists today at the intersection of two modes of failed universalization—democracy and capitalism. The question is whether a new political universality is possible.

#### Only universality lets us escape our isolated perspectives to effective grasp totality—pre-req to politics

McGowan 4 PhD from Ohio State English Department (Todd, 2004, “Introduction: Psychoanalysis after Marx”, *End of Dissatisfaction? Jacques Lacan and the Emerging Society of Enjoyment*”, p. 98-9)

However, as we can see in the passage from Laclau and Mouffe, there is some slippage between the impossibility of universality and the call for a prohibition against “the discourse of the universal.” In other words, they begin by claiming that universality is no longer possible, that the universal position “has been eradicated,” and then they insist that we must renounce universality. By making universality seem to be a possibility that we must avoid, Laclau and Mouffe cover over their insight into the evanescent nature of universality today. There is no need to avoid or renounce universality, precisely because we are no longer capable of it. And we are no longer capable of it insofar as we experience our subjectivity as one of, in Laclau and Mouffe’s terms, “a polyphony of voices, each of which constructs its own irreducible discursive identity.” For Laclau and Mouffe, as for much of the contemporary Left, this turn from universality to particularity is a turn away from domination and from the violence of trying to speak for others. What they miss, however, is what is lost along with the loss of universality. When we can no longer take up a universalizing perspective, we can no longer escape our isolated position in order to understand the social order as a totality. Without the universal, we lose the ability to interpret the events occurring in our everyday lives—we lose the ability to find meaning—because it is only the universal that makes interpretation possible. Interpretation operates by relating the particular to the universal, by taking a seemingly isolated event and seeing its larger importance. The universal provides the framework of meaning through which the particular acquires whatever sense it will acquire. Without the possibility of a reference to the universal, particular events lose their connection to the whole and thus take on the appearance of contingency. We can see this phenomenon at its most egregious in the contemporary attitude toward crime. People fear crime today in large part because it always threatens to take them by surprise. Rather than being the product of definite sociohistorical conditions, the criminal seems to emerge out of nowhere, strike, and then return to anonymity. As the victim (or potential victim) of the crime, I experience it as a wholly random act, disconnected with the functioning of the social order as a whole. What I experience most forcefully is the fact that the crime could have happened to anyone— that it could have happened to someone else just as easily as it happened to me. Certainly it is never anything that I did that triggered the crime—or at least such is my experience. Crimes appear, in other words, in almost every instance as particular acts without any link to the universal, without any connection to the social order in which they exist. One might have a theory about crime—blaming it on “liberal judges,” for instance—but when crime actually strikes, it seems random and irreducibly singular. Hence, it becomes impossible to interpret crime, to grasp particular crimes within their universal significance.9 But nonetheless crime does have a universal significance, and it does emerge from localizable conditions, despite its appearance of isolation and particularity. In fact, one could convincingly argue that crime should be easier to understand within the current context of global capitalism than ever before in human history, simply because never before have those who live in squalor been bombarded on a daily basis with nonstop images of opulence. Making connections like this is increasingly difficult today, however, because subjects increasingly view their experience as an isolated, essentially private experience.10

### A2: Ignores Race/Reductionist

#### Marxism doesn’t ignore race – just places a different causality

Taylor 11 [Keeanga-Yamahtta Taylor, on the editorial board of the International Socialist Review and a doctoral student in African American Studies at Northwestern University; “Race, class and Marxism,” SocialistWorker.org, <http://socialistworker.org/2011/01/04/race-class-and-marxism>]

Marxists believe that the potential for that kind of unity is dependant on battles and struggles against racism today. Without a commitment by revolutionary organizations in the here and now to the fight against racism, working-class unity will never be achieved and the revolutionary potential of the working class will never be realized. Yet despite all the evidence of this commitment to fighting racism over many decades, Marxism has been maligned as, at best, "blind" to combating racism and, at worst, "incapable" of it. For example, in an article published last summer, popular commentator and self-described "anti-racist" Tim Wise summarized the critique of "left activists" that he later defines as Marxists. He writes: [L]eft activists often marginalize people of color by operating from a framework of extreme class reductionism, which holds that the "real" issue is class, not race, that "the only color that matters is green," and that issues like racism are mere "identity politics," which should take a backseat to promoting class-based universalism and programs to help working people. This reductionism, by ignoring the way that even middle class and affluent people of color face racism and color-based discrimination (and by presuming that low-income folks of color and low-income whites are equally oppressed, despite a wealth of evidence to the contrary) reinforces white denial, privileges white perspectivism and dismisses the lived reality of people of color. Even more, as we'll see, it ignores perhaps the most important political lesson regarding the interplay of race and class: namely, that the biggest reason why there is so little working-class consciousness and unity in the Untied States (and thus, why class-based programs to uplift all in need are so much weaker here than in the rest of the industrialized world), is precisely because of racism and the way that white racism has been deliberately inculcated among white working folks. Only by confronting that directly (rather than sidestepping it as class reductionists seek to do) can we ever hope to build cross-racial, class based coalitions. In other words, for the policies favored by the class reductionist to work--be they social democrats or Marxists--or even to come into being, racism and white supremacy must be challenged directly. Here, Wise accuses Marxism of: "extreme class reductionism," meaning that Marxists allegedly think that class is more important than race; reducing struggles against racism to "mere identity politics"; and requiring that struggles against racism should "take a back seat" to struggles over economic issues. Wise also accuses so-called "left activists" of reinforcing "white denial" and "dismiss[ing] the lived reality of people of color"--which, of course, presumes Left activists and Marxists to all be white. - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - What do Marxists actually say? Marxists argue that capitalism is a system that is based on the exploitation of the many by the few. Because it is a system based on gross inequality, it requires various tools to divide the majority--racism and all oppressions under capitalism serve this purpose. Moreover, oppression is used to justify and "explain" unequal relationships in society that enrich the minority that live off the majority's labor. Thus, racism developed initially to explain and justify the enslavement of Africans--because they were less than human and undeserving of liberty and freedom. Everyone accepts the idea that the oppression of slaves was rooted in the class relations of exploitation under that system. Fewer recognize that **under capitalism, wage slavery is the pivot around which all other inequalities and oppressions turn**. Capitalism used racism to justify plunder, conquest and slavery, but as Karl Marx pointed out, it also used racism to divide and rule--to pit one section of the working class against another and thereby blunt class consciousness. **To claim**, as Marxists do, **that racism is a product of capitalism is not to deny** or diminish **its importance** or impact in American society. It is simply to explain its origins and the reasons for its perpetuation. Many on the left today talk about class as if it is one of many oppressions, often describing it as "classism." What people are really referring to as "classism" is elitism or snobbery, and not the fundamental organization of society under capitalism. Moreover, it is popular today to talk about various oppressions, including class, as intersecting. While it is true that oppressions can reinforce and compound each other, they are born out of the material relations shaped by capitalism and the economic exploitation that is at the heart of capitalist society. In other words, it is the material and economic structure of society that gave rise to a range of ideas and ideologies to justify, explain and help perpetuate that order. In the United States, racism is the most important of those ideologies. Despite the widespread beliefs to the contrary of his critics, Karl Marx himself was well aware of the centrality of race under capitalism. While Marx did not write extensively on the question of slavery and its racial impact in societies specifically, he did write about the way in which European capitalism emerged because of its pilfering, rape and destruction, famously writing: The discovery of gold and silver in America, the extirpation, enslavement and entombment in mines of the aboriginal population, the beginning of the conquest and looting of the East Indies, the turning of Africa into a warren for the commercial hunting of Black skins, signalized the rosy dawn of the era of capitalist production. He also recognized the extent to which slavery was central to the world economy. He wrote: Direct slavery is just as much the pivot of bourgeois industry as machinery, credits, etc. Without slavery you have no cotton; without cotton you have no modern industry. It is slavery that has given the colonies their value; it is the colonies that have created world trade, and it is world trade that is the pre-condition of large-scale industry. Thus slavery is an economic category of the greatest importance. Without slavery North America, the most progressive of countries, would be transformed into a patriarchal country. Wipe out North America from the map of the world, and you will have anarchy--the complete decay of modern commerce and civilization. Cause slavery to disappear and you will have wiped America off the map of nations. Thus slavery, because it is an economic category, has always existed among the institutions of the peoples. Modern nations have been able only to disguise slavery in their own countries, but they have imposed it without disguise upon the New World. Thus, there is a fundamental understanding of the centrality of slave labor in the national and international economy. But what about race? Despite the dearth of Marx's own writing on race in particular, one might look at Marx's correspondence and deliberations on the American Civil War to draw conclusions as to whether Marx was as dogmatically focused on purely economic issues as his critics make him out be. One must raise the question: If Marx was reductionist, how is his unabashed support and involvement in abolitionist struggles in England explained? If Marx was truly an economic reductionist, he might have surmised that slavery and capitalism were incompatible, and simply waited for slavery to whither away. W.E.B. Du Bois in his Marxist tome Black Reconstruction, quotes at length a letter penned by Marx as the head of the International Workingmen's Association, written to Abraham Lincoln in 1864 in the midst of the Civil War: The contest for the territories which opened the epoch, was it not to decide whether the virgin soil of immense tracts should be wedded to the labor of the immigrant or be prostituted by the tramp of the slaver driver? When an oligarchy of 300,000 slave holders dared to inscribe for the first time in the annals of the world "Slavery" on the banner of armed revolt, when on the very spots where hardly a century ago the idea of one great Democratic Republic had first sprung up, whence the first declaration of the rights of man was issued...when on the very spots counter-revolution...maintained "slavery to be a beneficial institution"...and cynically proclaimed property in man 'the cornerstone of the new edifice'...then the working classes of Europe understood at once...that the slaveholders' rebellion was to sound the tocsin for a general holy war of property against labor... They consider it an earnest sign of the epoch to come that it fell to the lot of Abraham Lincoln, the single-minded son of the working class, to lead his country through the matchless struggles for the rescue of the enchained race and the Reconstruction of a social order. Not only was Marx personally opposed to slavery and actively organized against it, but he theorized that slavery and the resultant race discrimination that flowed from it were not just problems for the slaves themselves, but for white workers who were constantly under the threat of losing work to slave labor. This did not mean white workers were necessarily sympathetic to the cause of the slaves--most of them were not. But Marx was not addressing the issue of consciousness, but objective factors when he wrote in Capital, "In the United States of America, every independent movement of the workers was paralyzed as long as slavery disfigured a part of the Republic. Labor cannot emancipate itself in the white skin where in the Black it is branded." Moreover, Marx understood the dynamics of racism in a modern sense as well--as a means by which workers who had common, objective interests with each other could also become mortal enemies because of subjective, but nevertheless real, racist and nationalist ideas. Looking at the tensions between Irish and English workers, with a nod toward the American situation between Black and white workers, Marx wrote: Every industrial and commercial center in England possesses a working class divided into two hostile camps, English proletarians and Irish proletarians. The ordinary English worker hates the Irish worker as a competitor who lowers his standard of life. In relation to the Irish worker he feels himself a member of the ruling nation and so turns himself into a tool of the aristocrats and capitalists of his country against Ireland, thus strengthening their domination over himself. He cherishes religious, social and national prejudices against the Irish worker. His attitude is much the same as that of the "poor whites" to the "niggers" in the former slave states of the USA. The Irishman pays him back with interest in his own money. He sees in the English worker at once the accomplice and stupid tool of the English rule in Ireland. This antagonism is artificially kept alive and intensified by the press, the pulpit, the comic papers, in short by all the means at the disposal of the ruling classes. This antagonism is the secret of the impotence of the English working class, despite its organization. It is the secret by which the capitalist maintains its power. And that class is fully aware of it. Out of this quote, one can see a Marxist theory of how racism operated in contemporary society, after slavery was ended. Marx was highlighting three things: first, that capitalism promotes economic competition between workers; second, that the ruling class uses racist ideology to divide workers against each other; and finally, that when one group of workers suffer oppression, it negatively impacts the entire class.

# 1NR

### \*\*\*\*A2: Perm – new sheet

#### Identity politics makes the realization of a true universal impossible—the 1AC’s obsession with exposing marginalized viewpoints makes short-circuits universalism

* Liberal politics as usual

Zizek, ’09 (Slavoj, senior researcher at the Institute of Sociology, University of Ljubljana, Slovenia, professor at the European Graduate School, and total BAMF, First as Tragedy, Then as Farce, p. 102, bgm)

***\*e tutti quanit = all the rest***

Liberals who acknowledge the problems of those excluded from the socio-political process formulate their goal as being the inclusion of those whose voices are not heard: all positions should be listened to, all interests taken into account, the human rights of everyone guaranteed, all ways of life, cultures, and practices respected, and so on. The obsession of this democratic discourse is the protection of all kinds of minorities: cultural, religious, sexual, *e tutti quanti*. The formula of democracy is patient negotiation and compromise. What gets lost here is the proletarian position, the position of universality embodied in the Excluded. This is why, upon a closer look, it becomes clear that what Hugo Chavez has begun doing in Venezuela differs markedly from the standard liberal form of inclusion: Chavez is not including the “excluded” dwellers of favelas as his *base* and then reorganizing political space and political forms so that the latter will “fit” the excluded. Pedantic and abstract as it may appear, this difference—between “bourgeois democracy” and “dictatorship of the proletariat” —is crucial.

#### Revolution must take the working class as its point of departure—identity politics are inherently reactionary because they are a struggle for positions of power within the current social matrix rather than the struggle for a radical new symbolic order

Bjerre & Lausten ’10 Henrik Jøker Bjerre is Assistant Professor at the Department of Philosophy and History of Ideas, Aarhus University, Denmark. His main research interests are moral philosophy, sociology and psychoa - nalysis. His publications include Kantian Deeds (Continuum, 2010). Carsten Bagge Laustsen is Associate Professor at the Department of Political Science, Aarhus University, Denmark. His main research interests are terrorism, political theology, political thought and modern social theory. He has previously published The Culture of Exception. Sociology Facing the Camp (Routledge, 2005, with Bülent Diken) and Sociology through the Projector (Routledge, 2008, with Bülent Diken). Humanities Insights : The Subject of Politics : Slavoj Žižek’s Political Philosophy. Penrith, GBR: Humanities-Ebooks, LLP, 2010. p 89-90. Copyright © 2010. Humanities-Ebooks, LLP. All rights reserved. <http://site.ebrary.com/lib/wayne/Doc?id=10567330&ppg=20>, accessed via e-book @ Wayne State, online, jj

Much Marxism has been stuck in the idea that any revolutionary change has to take the working class as its point of departure. The ‘ideal’ has been dirty, hard working industrial workers. It has been discussed whether small, private farmers were poor enough; whether one could be progressive, if one had changed from overalls to a suit. The central point for Žižek, however, is not the particular attributes of a certain group, but its placement in relation to the whole of capi -talism. The proletariat for Marx is the symbol of a universal human -ity – and as such it points towards a society beyond exploitation and humiliation. For Žižek, the important point is not whether the prole - tariat was or is the most suppressed class, but whether its existence embodies the internal contradictions and imbalances of capitalism. One must therefore distinguish between the working class as a social group (as placed within the social matrix, as majority) and the pro -letariat as an agent, which in a militant way struggles for ‘universal truth’ (as the group that breaks with the social matrix, as minority) (Žižek 1999: 226f). There is no necessary connection between these two groups. The crucial point is therefore whether one is answering to the idea of a system beyond the exploitation and impoverishment of capitalism, or whether one is fighting for one’s own privileges. Should the struggle be understood as a struggle for positions within the same social matrix, or is the struggle a struggle for a new and radically different society? Class struggle is not initially a struggle between classes, but rather a struggle to cover up or make apparent the flaws and inconsistencies of capitalism. The danger of perceiving class struggle as the strug - gle for recognition and rights, for example, is that it thereby supports fixed identities and social roles – and in effect capitalism as a system. Class struggle and classes themselves are not that which all social phenomena can be reduced to, but rather a generative matrix that conditions the different ideological horizons, through which society is attributed meaning (Žižek 2002b: 190). [A] class society in which the ideological perception of the class division was pure and direct would be a harmonious structure with no struggle – or to put it in Laclau’s terms, class antagonism would thereby be fully symbolized; it would no longer be impossible/real, but a simple differential structural feature. (Žižek 1999: 187) Žižek’s view of the proletariat is strongly inspired by Hegel’s thoughts of the Lumpenproletariat . This group was exactly charac - terised by not being contemplated as a class sui generis . For Žižek, similarly, the proletariat is the group that does not fit into the capital - ist whole. Revolutionary struggle is therefore not a struggle for more salary, for instance, as such a struggle will only make certain dis - placements within a given system possible. Any political act that is taking its point of departure in particular identities and their demands – whether they be ethnic, religious, sexual or simply different life - styles – remains reactionary (Žižek 2003: 132f). Revolutionary strug - gle, on the contrary, questions the symbolic itself – the fact that the being of the worker is reduced to a commodity.

#### Particular struggles sap energy from the alt and cause interpassivity

**Valentić 07** (Tonči, University of Zagreb, “Socialism reconsidered: Remarks on Žižek`s *Repeating Lenin”,* International Journal of Zizek Studies, <http://zizekstudies.org/index.php/ijzs/article/view/47/92>)

Žižek`s assertion that the main failure of today's Left is the acceptance of the cultural wars (such as anti-racist or feminist) as the dominant terrain of the emancipatory politics is very easy to defend. There are basically two possible ways for the socio-political engagement: either to play the game of the system, i.e. to engage in the "long march through the institutions" or to get active in new social movements (such as feminism, ecology, antiracism, minority rights, etc.). Žižek rejects both of them, being mainly negative towards the second since they are not political in a strict sense of the word: they are not more that "single issue movements" with the lack of social totality, focused only on one group of people or one single social issue, thus rejecting the universalism as an important part of any struggle in the public sphere. Instead of a "right to narrate" one personal story or story from one particular point of view of the so-called socially deprived groups, he emphasizes the "right to truth" as embodied in historical figure of St. Paul, calling on the traces of Alain Badiou for humanity beyond particular disintegration or abstract humanism, beyond pathetic brotherhood, instead based on the "politics of truth". He puts into play the role of Saint Paul because in the realm of political theology he aimed to ground a new collective that abandons and leaves behind both the "Roman" and "Jewish" way, i.e. false universalism of liberal democracy's discourse and orthodox right-wing fundamentalism. With his assertion of today's world seen as period of post-modern relativism where we should articulate the universal truth as prerequisite for emancipatory politics, he overwrites the Leninist notion of "politics of truth" claiming it still has to be reinvented and implied. Since Badoiu`s notion of Event tends to "emerge out of nowhere", the same goes for Leninism as radical gesture: it is the only way to cope with contemporary totalitarian liberal democracy, so this reference to Lenin serves as an effort to break the vicious circle of these false options, i.e. either to play the game in hope you can one day beat the system or to fight the system emphasizing social particularities. The statement is very clear and convincing: partial emancipation is possible only through universal emancipation, which means particular experience cannot be universalized and therefore denotes a conservative political gesture, such as an emphasis on minority rights, gay and lesbian organizations, etc. Žižek`s critical remarks on the contemporary dominant fetish of repressed "otherness" as well as a concept of social intolerance towards the Other become the battlefield for analysis of Other's intolerance towards us, which is not politically correct but is politically true. Just as radicalism often represents an empty gesture, by the same token it is also the case with the political correctness as well as fascination with victimized Other, which leads us to the new type of exclusion, the exclusion of those who do not play by those imposed rules and are a priori considered terrorists or oppressors if they belong to the majority group (for example, single white Anglo-American male in today's United States in contrast to black lesbian woman). The important step, or to put it more clearly, the main theoretical act, is precisely to define hegemonic ideological coordinates because if you act you are already in the game, playing by the rules. Regarding political Denkverbot mentioned before, Žižek humorously but nonetheless punctually paraphrases Max Horkheimer`s sentence "those who do not want to talk about fascism, should keep silent about capitalism" into "those who do not want to talk about global capitalism, should keep silent about socialism". Political activity is here accurately seen as an example of *political* *interpassivity*, i.e. doing things not to achieve something, but to prevent something from really changing, as in an unmentioned reference to famous Visconti`s phrase in one of his movies that "everything has to be changed in order to remain the same". The Return to Lenin has a quite different aim. Instead of playing the role of leftist intellectual who pretends to be critical towards capitalism discussing the transition from commodity fetishism to fetishism which is today itself commodified or to support the naïve belief in cyber communism as the possible way of resistance, he calls for repetition of Lenin's historical gesture with the famous question, once more brought into the intellectual debate: "Čto djelat?" or "What Is To Be Done?" Here it is crucial to emphasize the relevance of so called "high theory" today for the most concrete political struggle – as we remember from socialism, theoretical knowledge is not unimportant; quite contrary, as Žižek argues, it is the main incentive for the revolutionary act which follows it. Another author who uses Lenin as a crucial figure is Toni Negri (article "What to do with "What to do?" Or rather: The body of General Intellect"), who grippingly emphasized the biopolitical aspect of Leninism, (Lenin beyond Lenin), i.e. interpreting communist struggle as inevitably biopolitical struggle. Since the present ideologico-political constellation is characterized by the tendency to introduce moralistic reasoning into the political struggle, we are only a few steps away from a teleological explanation of liberal-democratic capitalism as the ultimate and eternal social order. The true problem with the democracy as *liberal* democracy is in its inherent paradox, since it is possible only in the conditions of its impossibility, and the major problem with the state from the socialist point of view is that it has always been seen as an instrument of oppression which can never be fully democratized. For that reason, socialist interventions pinpoint the dominant role of the state as well as democracy's insufficiencies.

### Case

### Classroom

#### Their oversimplified use of decolonizing discourse is just an attempt to reconcile their settler guilt without recognizing land colonization

Tuck & Yang 2012, Eve Tuck State University of New York at New Paltz K. Wayne Yang University of California, San Diego, “Decolonization is not a metaphor,” Decolonization: Indigeneity, Education & Society Vol. 1, No. 1, 2012, <http://decolonization.org/index.php/des/article/view/18630/15554>, KEL

There is a long and bumbled history of non-Indigenous peoples making moves to alleviate the impacts of colonization. The too-easy adoption of decolonizing discourse (making decolonization a metaphor) is just one part of that history and it taps into pre-existing tropes that get in the way of more meaningful potential alliances. We think of the enactment of these tropes as a series of moves to innocence (Malwhinney, 1998), which problematically attempt to reconcile settler guilt and complicity, and rescue settler futurity. Here, to explain why decolonization is and requires more than a metaphor, we discuss some of these moves to innocence: i. Settler nativism ii. Fantasizing adoption iii. Colonial equivocation iv. Conscientization v. At risk-ing / Asterisk-ing Indigenous peoples vi. Re-occupation and urban homesteading Such moves ultimately represent settler fantasies of easier paths to reconciliation. Actually, we argue, attending to what is irreconcilable within settler colonial relations and what is incommensurable between decolonizing projects and other social justice projects will help to reduce the frustration of attempts at solidarity; but the attention won’t get anyone off the hook from the hard, unsettling work of decolonization. Thus, we also include a discussion of interruptions that unsettle innocence and recognize incommensurability.

#### The system only need make its next argument for oppression with indigenous voices in order to successfully refashion the 1AC as a tool for immiseration

Gur-ze-ev, 98 - Senior Lecturer Philosophy of Education at Haifa, (Ilan, “Toward a nonrepressive critical pedagogy,” Educational Theory, Fall 48, <http://haifa.academia.edu/IlanGurZeev/Papers/117665/Toward_a_Nonreperssive_Critical_Pedagogy>)

From this perspective, the consensus reached by the reflective subject taking part in the dialogue offered by Critical Pedagogy is naive, especially in light of its declared anti-intellectualism on the one hand and its pronounced glorification of "feelings", "experience", and self-evident knowledge of the group on the other. Critical Pedagogy, in its different versions, claims to inhere and overcome the foundationalism and transcendentalism of the Enlightenment's emancipatory and ethnocentric arrogance, as exemplified by ideology critique, psychoanalysis, or traditional metaphysics. Marginalized feminist knowledge, like the marginalized, neglected, and ridiculed knowledge of the Brazilian farmers, as presented by Freire or Weiler, is represented as legitimate and relevant knowledge, in contrast to its representation as the hegemonic instrument of representation and education. This knowledge is portrayed as a relevant, legitimate and superior alternative to hegemonic education and the knowledge this represents in the center. It is said to represent an identity that is desirable and promises to function "successfully". However, neither the truth value of the marginalized collective memory nor knowledge is cardinal here. "Truth" is replaced by knowledge whose supreme criterion is its self-evidence, namely the potential productivity of its creative violence, while the dialogue in which adorers of "difference" take part is implicitly represented as one of the desired productions of this violence. My argument is that the marginalized and repressed self-evident knowledge has no superiority over the self-evident knowledge of the oppressors. Relying on the knowledge of the weak, controlled, and marginalized groups, their memory and their conscious interests, is no less naive and dangerous than relying on hegemonic knowledge. This is because the critique of Western transcendentalism, foundationalism, and ethnocentrism declines into uncritical acceptance of marginalized knowledge, which becomes foundationalistic and ethnocentric in presenting "the truth", "the facts", or ''the real interests of the group" - even if conceived as valid only for the group concerned. This position cannot avoid vulgar realism and naive positivism based on "facts" of self-evident knowledge ultimately realized against the self-evidence of other groups.

### Reductionist

#### Alt fails – idealization of non-western language romanticizes and blurs understandings of power.

Cheah 06 Pheng Cheah is Associate Professor of Rhetoric. November 2006, The Doreen B. Townsend Center for Humanities, The Limits of Thinking in Decolonial Strategies, <http://townsendcenter.berkeley.edu/publications/limits-thinking-decolonial-strategies>, jj

This leads me to my second question. The focus on re-embodying knowledges and knowledges in other languages can very easily lead to an idealization of bodily experiences and the concrete and the linguistic other. First, do concrete corporeal experiences offer a genuinely other perspective if the concrete bodily needs of individuals are crafted by the techniques of biopower as they are incorporated into the international division of labor? Second, indigenous languages are not inherently egalitarian or liberating just because they are non-European. Non-European languages can have hierarchical, conservative, or reactionary forms of address. Third, how are we to account for the startling similarity between Mignolo’s account of pluriversality and intercultural communication and the kind of cultural pluralism espoused by UNESCO? Here, one should also note the importance of language learning and multiculturalism to the operations of multinational capital. These are all forms of bio-power in the Foucauldian sense. How does one distinguish this from Mignolo’s sense of bio- or body-politics? The problem might well be that we cannot do so.¶ One would need to look at the true heterogeneity of the outside and the complex and multifarious technologies that fabricate these various outsides, not just at the level of a racist rhetoric of exclusion, but at the most concrete level of the production of the bodily needs and interests of subjects claiming alterity.

#### Reductionist juxtaposition of “western thinking” or “domination” with indigenous metaphysics romanticizes Native connection to the environment

Bosworth 10(Kai A Bosworth - B.A.: Environmental Studies, Macalester College, Saint Paul, MN, 1/1/2010. “Straws in the Wind: Race, Nature and Technoscience in Postcolonial South Dakotan Wind Power Development,” http://digitalcommons.macalester.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1007&context=envi\_honors)

Some contemporary environmentalist discourses have built images of “authentic” ¶ indigenous experience, people, or knowledge to legitimate and authorize exclusionary ¶ and privileging practices (Braun 2002, Moore et. al. 2003). Romanticized images of ¶ Native American spiritual, physical, beneficial, and/or harmonious relationships to nature ¶ have become centralized around a discourse that anthropologist Shepard Krech has called ¶ the “Ecological Indian” (1999).¶ 5¶ These discourses are complex, and are articulated in ¶ different ways through social movements (Nadasdy 2005, Li 2000), popular television ¶ shows and movies (Sturgeon 2009), discourses of science and social science (Agrawal ¶ 1995, Latour 1993), and through economic development, tourism, and environmental ¶ politics (Braun 2002). For Braun, many contemporary conservation discourses have ¶ assumed, ¶ that safeguarding indigenous cultures would help protect nature, because ¶ indigenous peoples are thought to have an interest and/or expertise in sustaining ¶ existing ecological relations; or, alternately, that the preservation of nature is ¶ necessary to preserve indigenous cultures, because they are seen to have a ¶ necessary relation to nature…Indigenous identities are defined and contained ¶ within the environmental imaginaries of European environmentalists and the ¶ postcolonial nation-state” (2002, 81).

### Mignolo

#### He’s more ev describing how mignolo’s method is flawed --- Mignolo’s K of Western epistemology is tautological and backfires --- the Eurocentric frame can be liberatory

Alcoff 07 Linda Martín Alcoff, Syracuse University, CR: The New Centennial Review, Volume 7, Number 3, Winter 2007, Mignolo’s Epistemology of Coloniality, Project Muse, jj

But I would press Mignolo on two points. The first concerns his notion of truth. Mignolo rejects the project of reclaiming epistemology and advocates for the shift to gnoseology, because he sees epistemology as fundamentally a project that is pursuant of truth, and because he sees truth as necessarily imperial, territorial, and denotative. But it is difficult to interpret Mignolo’s own project in any way other than as a project concerned with truth and with [End Page 97] the way in which the colonial systems of knowing inhibited and precluded both the understanding and the identification of truth. The denotative approach might have limited application to the shift he has in mind, but there is still an epistemically based normative distinction operating in his critique of the coloniality of power.¶ Take for example Mignolo’s use of Glissant’s concept of diversality, a concept he contrasts to universality but also to plurality in which alternatives are not in active integration or interaction. Diversality maps differences as coconstitutive and as potentially integrated, in the way that a bicultural identity can shift between multiple frames of reference without collapsing the differences but also without organizing them into hierarchies. As opposed to imperial resolutions, Glissant wants to maintain the fundamental ambiguity of colonial identity, that doubled reality that is alive to more than one “here and now.” This is not merely an ethically or politically motivated alternative to universality, I want to suggest, but a metaphysically motivated one. It is an alternative model for conceptualizing subjectivity and knowledge that might make sense of the existence of many worlds as well as to make visible their interrelationality and connectedness. This surely has political advantages, but it also can make possible an advance in descriptive adequacy for pluritopic horizons.¶ Thus I would contest Mignolo’s claim that truth is out of the picture. And I would argue against the shift from epistemology to gnoseology (rather than redefining epistemology) if it is mainly motivated by a desire to dispense with truth. However, what is important here is not the word we use for the project so much as retaining the normative epistemic content to the project of critique and reconstruction that Mignolo and other postcolonialists want to pursue. If gnoseology can retain the critical and normative dimensions that aim to improve our understanding of truth, as well as the more inclusive aims in regard to forms of knowing, then I am on board.¶ I think there is a similar issue with regard to Mignolo’s treatment of identity and difference, and which relates to the question I raised earlier concerning the metaphysical status of the colonial difference. On the one hand, Mignolo resists the reification of difference and thus emphasizes how difference is constituted by coloniality. This could lead a reader to imagine [End Page 98] that for Mignolo, difference a mere epiphenomenon of coloniality. But this is not his view. The colonial difference is for him a source of critical knowledge because its content conflicts with dominant knowledges. Thus, difference is constituted only in part by colonialism: its value and meaning is interpretively constitutued by colonialism, but this is not all there is to the colonial difference. In other words, it has metaphysical status.¶ Mignolo’s ambivalence about making this explicit is related to his ambivalence about identity. On the one hand he shies away from identity politics, § Marked 12:49 § but then again he articulates a form of it when he makes such claims as “for those whom colonial legacies are real (i.e. they hurt), that they are more (logically, historically, and emotionally) inclined than others to theorize the past in terms of coloniality” (2000b, 115). The concepts of identity and of identity politics are also assumed in the ongoing project that he defines as “shifting the geography of reason,” that is, both to motivate the shift and demarcate its direction. So I would like to see Mignolo work through more precisely and clearly how he is understanding the concepts of truth and of identity.¶ Let me end with a point that underscores the significance of Mignolo’s overall project. The discourse of national independence in Latin America, much more so than of African liberation discourses, was marked in no small measure by its acceptance of a Eurocentric frame. Leading thinkers such as Sarmiento and Alberdi did not contest the modernist macro-narrative except to the extent it excluded them. The significance of Mignolo’s work, for me, is the extent of his commitment to contest the status of Eurocentric metanarratives and refuse the gambit that might work for white male elites in Latin America but not for anyone else. In attempting to think beyond the house of modernity, Mignolo has truly built a house of many rooms.

#### Mignolo ignores current structural conditions limiting subaltern movements while simultaneously glorifying movements brought about by neoliberalism.

Alvarez 01 David Alvarez is assistant professor in the English Department at Grand Valley State University, Michigan, where he teaches courses in Anglophone and Latin American literature. His research interests include resistance and post-resistance writing, with a particular focus on South Africa and Central America. CR: The New Centennial Review 1.3 (2001) 325-343, Of Border-Crossing Nomads and Planetary Epistemologies, Project Muse, jj

Likening Lyotard to Mignolo might seem unfair given Mignolo's persistent disavowal of postmodernism and poststructuralism, both of which he regards as products of the modern world-system's imaginary, useful enough for an internal critique of that imaginary perhaps, but quite blind to the colonial difference. 17 Yet the idiom and focus of Mignolo's book suggest a deep affinity with the styles and schemas of the more reactionary elements of these movements. 18 It isn't just that the author seems overly attached to the splicing of words à la Derrida ("Border thinking from a territorial perspective becomes a machine of appropriation of the colonial differe/a/nces" [sic;45]), or that the purview of the book is unremittingly and self-referentially textual, leaving scant space for the social while fetishizing the semiotic. 19 It is also that as with assorted postmodern currents of thought, Border Gnoseology seems to entail a euphoric jettisoning of the past and an exaltation of the present, along with an exorbitation of language. 20 The present that is here exalted is that of globalization, which despite being the latest instantiation of the Occident's successive global designs, is also about to set us free from the burden of history through the gnoseological wisdom and spatializing magic of "the market": The current stage of globalization has market power as its final goal. This goal can dispense with the values attributed to civilization, since the goal toward expanding the market doesn't contemplate the conversion of people to Christianity or to citizenship. Although the market's objectives cannot be detached from the ideology of development and modernization,... they are spatial rather than temporal. The question is to expand the number of consumers all over the planet rather than to move towards a final destination set [End Page 332] up by the standard of civilization created in a local history (Europe) and projected as a global design. Thus the market is creating the conditions for the restitution of space and for facilitating the intellectual task of denying the denial of coevalness, the secret and natural weapon of the civilizing mission and of the standard of civilization during the second phase of modernity/ coloniality. (287) This is all seems rather closer to Chase Manhattan's report to its investors in Mexico, say, than to Subcomandante Marcos's meditations on the ravages of neoliberalism and on the grip of market ideology on erstwhile Latin American leftists. Contrary to postmodernism's frequent mistrust of grand narratives, however, Mignolo is unembarrassed to posit not just a macronarrative but a telos, as the above quotation shows. Indeed, the thrust of the whole book is that we stand poised on the brink of an astounding epistemological breakthrough that will release a myriad subalternized knowledges from the custody of "abstract universals" (88) and usher in a radiant future of desubalternized identities and nonhegemonic gnoseologies. Where exactly will this world-historical transformation leave us? In his discussion of Bernardo Canal Feijóo's attempts to account (philosophically) for the dislocations of Latin American identity, Mignolo provides us with a possible answer: "not being able to be... where one is" (334). As the author emphatically notes: Not being able to be where one is is the promise of an epistemological potential and a cosmopolitan transnationalism that could overcome the limits and violent conditions generated by being always able to be where one belongs. I am where I think (334). It is probably not accidental that the state of "not being able to be where one is" would seem to leave us hovering somewhere above and beyond historical circumstances, attachments, and determinations. For in Local Histories/Global Designs, history is represented not as a site of contradiction, struggle, contestation, negotiation, progress, and retrogression, but as a grand succession of dehistoricized tableaux, devoid of actors, agents, [End Page 333] subjects, and, most of all, of contextual nuance. 21 To be sure, the author often provides us with a numbing concatenation of historical facts. But for the most part the facticity of his argument is of a positivist sort that deprives facts of their contextual and relational meanings. So, for instance, dates such as 1848 and 1898 and historical periods such as the Cold War periodically make cameo appearances on the makeshift stage that Mignolo constructs, but they are then quickly shuffled offstage to leave us with an ideal(ist) view of the theatrical space in which the historical action is enacted. Rosemary O' Hanlon and David Washbrook have observed that in the work of the scholars involved in the (subcontinental) Subaltern Studies' project, "timeless and undifferentiated conceptions of the past" are substituted for a time-bound and differentiated analysis of history. 22 The same, I would submit, can be said of Mignolo's argument, which for all its reliance on the longue-durée histories of the world-systems school, seems to float along in a dehistoricized void. Moreover, it seems rather odd that in a book about subaltern "local histories" pitted against hegemonic "global designs," such matters as class conflict and capital accumulation on a transnational scale are conspicuous by their absence, as are such devastating agents of globalization as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. 23 Similarly, while there is much earnest discussion of hegemonic orders of knowledge we find nary a mention of the authoritarian political regimes against which many of Latin America's subalterns must daily struggle. Moreover, such timely topics as the militarization of the U.S.-Mexico borderlands and the neocolonial machinations of the maquiladora economy seem to have no place in the author's purview. It might reasonably be objected at this point that it is unfair to judge Mignolo's book by criteria that are entirely extraneous to its own framework. The author, however, insists that his and allied projects have tremendous ethical and political ramifications. 24 But what precise ethical and political meanings can we ascribe to a text in which the enemy is not capitalism, or patriarchy, or imperialism, or any nameable mode of domination but rather an indeterminate coloniality of power straddling the desituated borders of the colonial difference? Perhaps a positive answer to this question can be located in the manner [End Page 334] in which the book seems to confer agency upon those fractured subjects who are emerging out of the fissures of our postcontemporary planetary moment. Yet the book is mostly silent about actual (as opposed to textual or authorial) subjects who straddle borders, who negotiate intersecting pluralities of meaning and difference, and who resist their psychic fragmentation and material exploitation by divisive orders of exploitation. 25 One can only regret that the author did not pursue a productive metaphor found in his earlier work, "the dark side of the renaissance," and probe what Alison Brysk calls "the dark side of globalization." 26 Conversely, it would have been plausible to expect some discussion of the new social movements that are redefining political practice across Latin America's frontiers. Instead, we have border-crossing, gnoseological nomads delivering a euphoric coup-de-grace to moribund epistemologies before they leap into a borderless posthistorical future. 27